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We cannot continue with a majority of the world's people
excluded from participation in global economic management.
For instance, the G-7 self-evidently excludes most of the
world's population and a large number of the world's substantial and fast-growing economies. The fact is that the
countries which will increasingly provide our best hope for
economic growth and new markets are simply not represented
where it most counts.
-Peter Sutherland'
INTRODUCTION

Recent debates concerning the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations raise many basic questions regarding the economic and social
order in which we live, both nationally and internationally. The likely
1. Peter Sutherland, GATT Director-General, Address at the World Economic

Forum Meeting in Davos, Switzerland (Jan. 28, 1994), in Cherian George, GATT
Chief Wants a New World Economic Body, THE STRAITs TIMEs, Jan. 29, 1994, at 15.
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effect of the Uruguay Round upon French farmers has been much
discussed, as has the possible effect of NAFTA upon the environment,
and upon low wage workers and other disadvantaged groups in the
United States and Canada. The focus here will be upon another aspect
of the controversy over trade, i.e. the failure of the present international trade regime to protect the legitimate interests of developing
countries. More broadly, the nature of the economic and social
relationship between the industrialized democracies and the developing
countries is an underlying theme. This article is not a call for an
international redistribution of wealth, however it does argue that in
today's interdependent international community, progress towards environmentally sustainable prosperity can best be achieved through
international economic institutions and principles which protect the
interests of all states, irrespective of wealth, and not solely those of
the dominant group of states.
In the past, developing countries have challenged the legitimacy
of the international trade order dominated by the industrialized democracies, 2 but with the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round
of multilateral trade negotiations, 3 developing countries are now to be
brought into the mainstream of international trade to a greater extent
than ever before. Their willingness to accept trade liberalization in6
areas such as services, 4 investments5 and intellectual property rights
demonstrates their strong commitment to strengthening the principles
and institutions of the international trade regime.
Despite the new spirit of compromise and cooperation from
developing countries, a number of North-South trade tensions remain.
The linking of the international trade regime to the international
environmental regime has recently emerged as a key area of contention.
2. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/
9559 (1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (asserting that "[t]he present international
economic order is in direct conflict with current developments in international political
and economic relations."). See also infra notes 51-73 and accompanying text.
3. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 9 (1994).
4. The Uruguay Round: General Agreement on Trade in Services, and Annexes,
Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 44 (1994).
5. The Uruguay Round: Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures,
Document MTN/FA, Part II, Annex IA-7, of December 15, 1993 and MTN/FA/
Corr.I of December 15, 1993.
6. The Uruguay Round: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual
Property Rights, Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods, Dec. 15, 1993, 33 I.L.M. 81
(1994).
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When the GATT was founded issues of the environment and
development were not viewed as central to the functioning of the
international trade regime. Today, these matters are recognized to be
of great importance, just as the norms and institutions of the international trade order are being updated by the agreements reached in
the Uruguay Round. The new agreements go very far in broadening
the GATT system's range of application, and they also provide a good
basic framework for incorporating the environmental imperative into
the GATT regime. But the vital goal of "greening the GATT" cannot
be effectively achieved unless the principles and decision-making procedures of the international trade order come to accommodate the
legitimate interests of developing countries more fully than they have
in the past. While the power-oriented voting structures within the
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund have not prevented
these institutions from responding to environmental concerns, the
integration of these concerns into the international trade regime will
require sacrifice by all states, and thus cannot be imposed by the rich
countries upon the poor.
Part I of this article briefly reviews the principles and institutions
of the existing international trade order in a historical context. Part II
focuses upon some long-standing international trade issues of special
concern to developing countries and upon the international trade
regime's response to these issues. Part III considers the impact of the
environmental revolution upon the trade interests of developing countries, while Part IV reflects upon the future of developing countries in
the international trade order and under the new World Trade Organization.
I.

PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS OF THE POST WORLD WAR

II

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER IN HISTORICAL CONTEXT

A.

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS AND THE WORLD ECONOMIC

ORDER

World War II was preceded by the great depression, the most
devastating global economic collapse in recorded history. Many of the
factors contributing to that collapse were linked to international trade
and exchange policies. The Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act7 passed into law
by the United States in 1930 was intended to protect American jobs
from foreign competition, but instead provoked protectionist measures
by other countries and ultimately choked off international trade to the
7. The Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. No. 71-361, 46 Stat. 590-762 (1930).
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detriment of all.' This problem was exacerbated when countries also
manipulated exchange rates by devaluing their currencies in an effort
to gain an advantage in trade. The monumental failure which resulted

from these short-sighted policies of economic nationalism inspired the

architects of the post World War II economic order to fashion
international institutions which would prevent a recurrence of this
behavior. 9 The system of multilateral economic institutions originally
proposed has sometimes been likened to a three legged stool, each leg

corresponding to a separate, specialized agency affiliated with the
United Nations (UN).

One leg of the stool was to be a strong International Trade

Organization (ITO) based on a treaty (the Havana Charter) which
would have mandated the elimination of most barriers to trade. I0 Even

though the proposed ITO was largely an American initiative, the
Havana Charter was never sent to the United States Senate for

approval. Since the United States was indisputably the preeminent
economic power in the world at the time, the dream of an ITO could
not survive without American support. The less ambitious framework
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was all that
could be agreed to at the time." Although the GATT had originally

been created as an interim arrangement, the failure of the Havana

8. See Edward J. Ray, Changing Patterns of Protectionism: The Fall in Tariffs
and the Rise in Non-Tariff Barriers, 8 J. L. INT'L Bus. 285, 295 (1987) (noting that
the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930 resulted in United States tariffs reaching an all
time high average of 5901o in 1932).
9. See RICHARD N. GARDNER, STERLING-DOLLAR DIPLOMACY IN CURRENT PERSPECTIVE: THE ORIGINS AND THE PROSPECTS OF OUR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER

71-80, 210 (1980) (discussing how a plan prepared by Harry Dexter White, Deputy to
U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Henry Morgenthau, and a plan prepared by British
economist, John Maynard Keynes, together provided the basis for the 1944 Bretton
Woods agreements creating the International Monetary Fund and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development).
10. The ITO Charter's formal title was Charter for an International Trade
Organization, but it is often referred to as the Havana Charter for an International
Trade Organization, or the "Havana Charter." Charter for an International Trade
Organization, U.N. Doc. E/CoNF.2/78 (1948) [hereinafter Havana Charter].
11. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, opened for signature Oct. 30,
1947, 61 Stat. 1, 55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GATT]. See also GATT BASIC INSTRUMENTS AND SELECTED DOCUMENTS 1-78 (1969). The Uruguay Round resulted in
agreement to create a new and more powerful World Trade Organization (WTO) to
take the place of the weaker GATT mechanism. If and when this new WTO comes
into being the original dream of three strong institutional pillars of the international
economic order may finally be realized. For a discussion of the new WTO, see infra
notes 238-51 and accompanying text.
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Charter left the GATT to take on an expanded role as a permanent
multilateral trade mechanism.
The other two legs of the stool were completed more or less as
planned, pursuant to agreements reached at the Bretton Woods Monetary and Financial Conference of 1944. Two key international economic institutions were negotiated at that Conference, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) 2 and the International Bank for Reconstruction
and Development (IBRD). 3 Each institution plays an important role
in today's international economic order.
The IMF was created to promote international monetary cooperation. Its primary tasks were to maintain exchange rate stability, help
members to deal with short term balance of payments disequilibria
14
and in general to establish a reliable international payments system.
Since its inception, the task of the IMF has evolved considerably, and
today it plays an especially important role helping developing countries
and their creditors to manage the international debt crisis. 5 The IMF
allows debtor countries to draw upon its financial resources only if
they comply with IMF "conditionality.' ' 6 In practice, this means that
it makes financing available to debtors only if they promise to comply
with conditions concerning their national economic policies and performance. After initial approval, it continues to act as an international
financial policeman monitoring compliance with the promises exacted
from debtor countries, and giving a creditworthiness green light to the
7
international financial community. '

12. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, Dec. 27, 1945,
60 Stat. 1401 (1947) (entered into force for the United States on Dec. 27, 1945). The
Articles of Agreements were subsequently amended. Articles of Agreement of the
International Monetary Fund, amended by July 28, 1969, 20 U.S.T. 2775 (first
amendment); Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, amended by
Apr. 1, 1978, 29 U.S.T. 2203 (second amendment).
13. Articles of Agreement of the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, Dec. 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1440, amended by Dec. 16, 1965, 16 U.S.T.
1942 (entered into force for the United States on Dec. 27, 1945).
14. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note 12,
art. 1.
15. For a more in-depth discussion on the IMF role in dealing with the
international debt crisis, see E. Walter Robichek, The InternationalMonetary Fund:
An Arbiter in the Debt Restructuring Process, 23 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 143, 143-

54 (1984).
16. See Guidelines on Conditionality, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMIC LAW 393-94 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds., 1990) [hereinafter
BDIEL].
17. See Robichek, supra note 15, at 150.
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The IBRD, the central institution in what is commonly referred
to as the World Bank Group, was established in 1945 in order to
finance the reconstruction of countries devastated by World War II as
well as to finance the development of more traditionally impoverished
areas of the world. 18 The Marshall Plan, introduced in June of 1947,
eventually assumed the burden of financing reconstruction in Europe
leaving the Bank free to devote its resources to the development task. 9
The Bank's role goes beyond providing development financing,
since it has always provided borrowers with advice on development as
well. 20 There is a fine line indeed between giving advice on development
and giving general advice on economic policy, and in practice, the
Bank now shares with the IMF responsibility for inducing debtor
countries to make much needed macroeconomic reforms. 2' Continuing
problems with international debt have made the Bank and the IMF
18. The purposes of the IBRD are set out in article 1 of the Articles of Agreement
of the IBRD. Examples of these purposes are to "assist in the reconstruction and
development of territories of members by facilitating the investment of capital for
productive purposes," (art. l(i)); to "promote private foreign investment," (art. I(ii));
and to "promote long-range balanced growth of international trade and the maintenance of equilibrium in balances of payments by encouraging international investment
for the development of the productive resources of members, thereby assisting in
raising productivity, the standard of living and conditions of labor in their territories,"
(art. l(iii)). see Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, supra note 13.
19. See GARDNER, supra note 9, at 302-04 (discussing how the operations of
both the IMF and the World Bank in Europe yielded priority to the Marshall Plan
during the late 1940s).
20. See Articles of Agreement of the IBRD, supra note 13, art. l(iv) (enjoining
the Bank "to arrange the loans made or guaranteed by it in relation to international
loans through other channels so that the more useful and urgent projects, large and
small alike, will be dealt with first." In order to do this, the Bank identifies what it
considers to be the highest development priorities of each of its borrowers and through
advice and lending it supports these priorities).
21. Some resist the idea that the World Bank can impose structural adjustment
conditionality on its borrowers as well as the IMF can. In September of 1988, the
Bank agreed to make a large loan to Argentina in exchange for a "Letter of
Development Policy" in which that country pledged to undertake major macroeconomic reforms. The IMF had been negotiating with Argentina for over six months
concerning many of the same policies, and some IMF officials were skeptical that the
Bank would be able to enforce the reforms. Such enforcement has traditionally been
left to the IMF, but Argentina preferred to deal with the Bank, probably because the
reforms requested by the Bank were somewhat less stringent than those of the IMF.
See Robert J. McCartney & Hobart Rowen, World Bank Agrees to $1.25 Billion in
Loans to Argentina; Country to Make Major Economic Reforms, THE WASH. POST,
Sept. 26, 1988, at A12. Since this incident, the Bank has been more careful in
attempting to avoid encroaching upon the Fund's role as international financial
policeman.
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more important that ever to the functioning of the international
economic order.
While the Bank and the IMF fulfill an indispensable role in
enforcing a certain order within the international regimes governing
international monetary affairs and development, the enforcement power
they wield is not exercised in a symmetrical way since not every country
is equally policed by these institutions. A basic problem of asymmetry
emerged as it became evident that it was principally the developing
countries which would have to accept the "conditionality" of the
World Bank and IMF. The obligation of the borrower is inherent in
the concept of banking, but the sovereign borrower can be sensitive
to any perceived derogation from sovereign equality. From the perspective of these countries, it seems unfair that the United States, now
sometimes said to be the world's largest debtor country,22 is not
required to follow an IMF austerity program. The decision-making
structure within the Bretton Woods institutions, as discussed below,
reinforces the problem of asymmetrical enforcement.
B.

DECISION-MAKING IN THE BRETTON WOODS INSTITUTIONS

The World Bank and the IMF possess similar organizational
characteristics. All powers are vested in a Board of Governors, com2
prised of one governor and one alternate appointed by each member. 1
The actual voting power of each member country is proportionally
related to its financial contribution to the institution. In the IMF, for
example, each country has 250 votes and one additional vote for each
part of its IMF financial quota equivalent to 100,000 special drawing
rights. 24 The voting formula in the World Bank follows the same
principle of "weighting" the vote of each member state to correspond
with the financial contribution made to the organization. 25
This weighted voting formula has been very unpopular with the
developing countries since, in effect, it institutionalizes within the Fund
and the Bank the inequality between the economically strong countries
and the economically weak ones. The desire of these latter countries
22. See Well Would you Debit It, THE ECONOMIST, Aug. 1, 1987, at 73 (observing
that "[elconomic reporters love to refer to America as the world's biggest debtor,"
but that "if America's external assets and liabilities were added up properly, it would
quite possibly be found that it is ...

23. Articles
Agreement of the
24. Articles
quotas reflect the
25. Articles

[instead], the world's biggest creditor.").

of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 12, art. XII, § 2; Articles of
IBRD, supra note 13, art. V, § 2.
of Agreement of the IMF, supra note 12, art. XII, § 5. These
size and strength of each country's economy.
of Agreement of the IBRD, supra note 13, art. V, § 3.
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for greater equality has led to the adoption, by the United Nations
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN
General Assembly, of resolutions calling for the reform of the decisionmaking procedures in international economic and financial institu-

tions

.

6

The weighted voting procedure may seem to conflict with notions
of "sovereign equality, '27 but it has the virtue of being a practical
solution to a very real problem. The major contributors to the Bank
and the Fund are naturally concerned about how the funds they
contribute are used. In the case of the Bank, contributors are also
concerned about potential liability should the Bank ever face losses
due to defaulting borrowers. Weighted voting answers these concerns
and thereby assures the participation of donor countries. This system
may not actually violate the principle of sovereign equality, but it does
recognize the economic inequality between member states, something
which cannot realistically be ignored.
As noted above, the problem posed by this inequality is compounded by the fact that, with few exceptions, only developing countries (and the new economies in transition from the former Soviet
bloc) need to draw upon the resources of the Bretton Woods twins.
An asymmetrical regime results from the fact that only these countries
are required to accept the terms and conditions commonly imposed by
these institutions upon borrowing countries which draw heavily upon
their resources. In practice, this means that while industrialized countries wield predominant power in the decision to lend or not to lend,
the bitter but often needed medicine of economic austerity is disproportionately imposed upon developing countries. We will see below
that similar problems of asymmetry have emerged with regard to the
new and emerging international environmental regime.
C.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE THEORY

Prior to 1800, the prevailing "mercantilist" view of international
trade assumed that the prosperity of a country could be maximized by
policies which ensured a surplus of exports over imports. 21 Since
precious metals were used to settle international accounts, this balance
would generate a net inflow of gold and silver from the rest of the
26. See, e.g., Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, G.A. Res. 3281,
U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 31, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975).
27. Article 2,
1 of the UN Charter states that "It]he Organization is based on
the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members." U.N. CHARTER art. 2,
1.
28. See DAVID A. BALDWIN, ECONOMIC STATECRAFT 72-77 (1985).
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world. The implicit assumption was that the world's economic pie was
of constant size, and therefore any gains experienced by one nation
from trade had to come at the expense of its trading partners. In
short, international trade was viewed as a zero-sum game.
In 1776, Adam Smith published his now classic work, Wealth of
Nations, 29 which explained that nations could engage in mutually
beneficial trade. This analysis was taken one step further with the
formulation of the principle of comparative advantage in the 19th
century by David Ricardo and John Stuart Mill.30 As this theory
shows, a nation can benefit from international trade even if it cannot
produce any one good more efficiently than its trading partners. 3 If
each nation specializes in the production of those products which it
can produce with the greatest relative efficiency, and can then trade
freely with other nations for the other products it needs; the greater
overall efficiency which results from this process increases the size of
the world's economic pie, providing a higher standard of living for
2
all. In short, international trade can be a positive-sum interaction.1
This economic theory has a great deal of appeal. Not only does
it offer the prospect of greater efficiency and greater wealth, it also
implies that as far as international trade is concerned, there is a
fundamental community of economic interests among states. So it was
that at the end of World War II, the Havana Charter's stillborn ITO,
and to a lesser extent its less ambitious counterpart the GATT, were
designed to put this theory into effect by promoting a liberalized trade
regime.
II.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE PRINCIPLES AND THE DEVELOPING
COUNTRIES

Although we are familiar today with the economic division between the industrialized countries of the North and the developing
countries of the South,33 the situation was quite different in the
29.

ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH

OF NATIONS (1776).
30. See PAUL

A. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 647-50 (1970).
31. Id.
32. For a mathematical explanation of the gains from trade according to the
principle of comparative advantage, see MORDECHAI E. KREININ, INTERNATIONAL
ECONOMICS: A POLICY APPROACH 214-53 (1979). For a more basic discussion see Sylvia
Nasar, A Primer: Why Economists Favor Free-Trade Agreement, N.Y.

TIMES,

Sept.

17, 1993, at Al.
33. By now, any attempt to divide the world into simple North and South camps
according to economic criteria is necessarily a vast oversimplification. Countries
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immediate Post World War II era. Many countries we know as
developing countries today, and most of those in Africa and Asia, had
not yet achieved independence from colonial domination in the 1940s.
As a result, the voice of developing countries at Bretton Woods and
Havana was somewhat muted. Few negotiators at these conferences
could have fully anticipated the extent of the future division between
developed and developing countries. Ultimately, the Bretton Woods

institutions were created by and for the industrialized countries.

From the beginning, many in the developing world viewed proposals for a free trade system as a threat to their hopes of rapid
34
industrialization as well as to their independence and sovereignty.
They feared an open trading system would make it impossible for the
non-industrialized countries of the South to achieve industrialization
because any new "infant industries" they might try to create would
be unable to compete with the established foreign competition.3 5
The history of relations between North and South has left many
in the developing areas of the world with some palpable resentment

about international economic relations,36 and developing countries have

tried, with varying degrees of success, to maintain "Third World"
political unity within the United Nations system.3 7 The nineteenth
century "colonial" pattern of trade relations had been typified by a
division of labor which prevented the industrial development of the

South. The largely industrialized colonial powers had no interest in
developing competing industries in their colonial possessions, thus they
tapped their colonies as a source of primary commodities. This, in
traditionally considered to be part of the South include relatively wealthy and newly
industrialized states (NICs) such as Singapore, impoverished "fourth world" states
such as Ethiopia, oil rich OPEC states such as Saudi Arabia, and countries in many
other distinct economic categories. Nonetheless, at times debate over certain economic
and political issues still seems to break down along the lines of North and South,
industrialized countries versus developing countries, rich countries versus poor countries. When the term developing country is used in this article, in no way is this
intended to imply that there is a solid homogenous bloc of "Third World" states
which agree on every issue, or even on most issues.
34. CLAm Wi¢cox, A CHARTER FOR WORLD TRADE 30-31 (1949).
35. GUNNAR MYRDAL, BEYOND THE WELFARE STATE: ECONOMIC PLANNING AND
ITS INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS 170-71 (1967).

36. See P.T.

BAUER, DISSENT ON DEVELOPMENT

147 (1976).

37. See Bernard D. Nossiter, At the U.N., the 'So-Called Third World' Turns
Real, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 1981, § 4, at 5 (noting that Alexander Haig, then U.S.
Secretary of State had disparaged what he referred to as the "so-called Third Worlda misleading term if there ever was one," and also reporting that while U.S. American
Chief Delegate to the U.N. Jeanne Kirkpatrick did not find the Third World to be a
useful concept, she conceded that "the third world has reality, inside the U.N.").
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effect, relegated these developing areas to a peripheral role in the
economies of their colonizing powers. The economy of the colonial
"periphery" was used as a subordinate appendage of the industrial
economy of the colonial "center" or "metropolis," supplying commodities to the metropolitan power and also serving as a market for
industrialized goods. Those developing areas that achieved political
independence sought to sever the economic dependency by establishing
their own industries, and they were suspicious that free trade would
serve only to perpetuate their underdevelopment." Although many
parts of the world were still under colonial domination when the
nations of the world met in Havana, quite a few representatives were
there from what were then referred to as "underdeveloped countries,"
and they were able to make their case in Havana. a9
The Havana Charter included a number of important provisions
reflecting the special interests of developing countries. In fact, an
entire chapter of that instrument was devoted to economic development
and reconstruction. 40 Unlike the GATT, which has never been development oriented, the Charter provided that the ITO would be obligated
to cooperate with the UN and other appropriate international organizations on all phases of industrial and general development "especially
41
of those countries that are still relatively underdeveloped. '
The Charter explicitly recognized a potential need for special
governmental assistance to promote the establishment or development
of particular industries. 42 It then set out very detailed and complicated
formulations on the eligibility of underdeveloped countries for a release
38. L.K. JHA, NORTH SOUTH DEBATE 18-21 (1982).
39. The following developing countries were represented at Havana: Afghanistan, Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Burma, Ceylon, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica,
Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti,
India, the Republic of Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Liberia, Mexico, Nicaragua,
Pakistan, Panama, Peru, the Philippines, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, Transjordan,
Turkey, South Africa, Uruguay, and Venezuela.
40. Havana Charter, supra note 10, arts. 8-15.
41. Havana Charter,supra note 10, art. 10(3).

42. Article 13(1) of the Charter reads as follows:
The Members recognize that special governmental assistance may be required
to promote the establishment, development or reconstruction of particular
industries or branches of agriculture, and that in appropriate circumstances
the grant of such assistance in the form of protective measures is justified.
At the same time they recognize that an unwise use of such measures would
impose undue burdens on their own economies and unwarranted restrictions
on international trade, and might increase unnecessarily the difficulties of
adjustment for the economies of other countries.

Havana Charter, supra note 10, art. 13(1).
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from certain trade commitments to the extent necessary to allow them
to establish new industries. 43 While these "industrialization escapes"
were not considered to be adequate by the developing country representatives at Havana, they did establish the principle that under the
proposed regime, infant industries might be developed through devices
such as import quotas and trade preferences, but only with international sanction according to the Charter." The Charter also contained
provisions concerning special treatment for what are now recognized
as two traditional concerns of developing countries: primary
commodities 45 and economic cooperation among developing countries.46
Unfortunately for the developing countries, none of these provisions of special interest to developing countries survived the failure of
the Havana Charter. The GATT is a simplified trade agreement and
a much less ambitious project than the Havana Charter. The principle
of nondiscrimination in trade between parties is the foundation of the
GATT legal order. 4 While one article of the GATT did provide for
the use of nondiscriminatory quantitative restrictions to further economic development or reconstruction, 48 a number of onerous conditions, including a requirement for the prior approval of the contracting
parties, deprived this device of any true utility. 49 In short, the GATT
did not initially provide developing countries with the special arrangements incorporated for their benefit into the defunct Havana Charter.5 0
A.

STRUCTURAL CRITIQUE OF THE THEORY

As countries with little industrial base who were principally importers of manufactures and exporters of primary commodities, especially in the immediate post World War II period, developing countries
expected little short term benefit from the GATT's approach to trade
43. Havana Charter,supra note 10, arts. 13-14.
44. Havana Charter,supra note 10, art. 13(1).
45. Havana Charter, supra note 10, arts. 55-65.
46. Havana Charter,supra note 10, arts. 15, 16(3).
47. GATT, supra note 11, arts. 1, 13.
48. Havana Charter, supra note 10, art. 18.
49. GATT, supra note 11, art. 18.
50. As Joan Edelman Spero notes:
The original GATT agreement was designed only as an interim measure
and included none of the provisions for development which the South had
fought to include in the Havana Charter. There were no provisions for
development cooperation, for commodity agreements, for preferential trading
systems for the South, or for the use of restrictions to further development.

JOAN E. SPERO, THE POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 184 (1981).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

liberalization. Indeed, it seemed to offer them the prospect of failing
in international industrial competition and then being locked into the
familiar pattern of dependence upon and dominance by the industrialized world-a pattern which they associated with the colonial domination from which many of them had only recently emerged. The
developing countries feared that the promised benefits of an open
trade regime might not materialize for some time, and that even then
they would not necessarily be distributed to those in the developing
world. The dissatisfaction of developing countries with the GATT and
the Bretton Woods institutions eventually led to the creation of a new
international institution, the United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD). 5 1 In the context of UNCTAD, founded in
1964, developing countries mobilized in support of fundamental changes
in the international trade order.
In 1950, Raail Prebisch, a Venezuelan economist with the United
Nations Economic Commission for Latin America, completed an
analysis of the historical trade relationship between industrialized
countries and developing countries between 1876 and 1938.52 He concluded that international trade relations between the North and the
South were structurally biased against the interests of the South.5 3 He
argued that since the South tended to export primary commodities to
the North while the North tended to export industrialized goods to the
South, changes in the relative prices of these two types of goods
suggested a disturbing trend.14 His research suggested that the prices
of developing country exports would tend to decline relative to the
51. See Robert E. Hudec, Gatt and the Developing Countries, 1992 COLUM.
Bus. L. REV. 67, 71 (1992).
52. Raial Prebisch, The Economic Development of Latin America and its
PrincipalProblems, U.N. ECON., -U.N. Doc. E/CN. 12/89/Rev. 1 (1950).
53. Prebisch notes:
Speaking generally, technical progress seems to have been greater in industry
than in the primary production of peripheral countries ....
Consequently,
if prices had been reduced in proportion to increasing productivity, the
reduction should have been less in the case of primary products than in that
of manufactures, so that as the disparity between productivities increased,
the price relationship should have shown a steady improvement in favour of
the countries of the periphery ....
Had this happened . . . the benefits of
technical progress would thus have been distributed alike throughout the
world ....
[Instead] the price relation turned steadily against primary
production from the 1870's until the Second World War ... With the same
amount of primary products, only 63 per cent of the finished manufactures
which could be bought in the 1860's were to be had in the 1930s.
Id. at 8.
54. Id.
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prices of their imports from industrialized countries leading to deteriorating terms of trade." He concluded that this phenomenon would
make it difficult, if not impossible, for the developing countries to
growth without some fundamenachieve acceptable rates of5 economic
6
policy.
trade
in
tal changes
Within UNCTAD, the developing countries began to push for
7
changes in the international trade and development regimes. In 1974,
the developing countries formulated their demands for change in the
form of resolutions passed by the United Nations General Assembly
which together incorporate the call for a New International Economic
Order (NIEO). The Declaration on the Establishment of a New
International Economic Order was accepted by consensus in the General Assembly" and articulated the principal demands of the developing
countries for change and outlined the principles upon which the
proposed new order would be based. The Charter of Economic Rights
and Duties of States (CERDS), passed on the same day, was an
attempt to affirm and strengthen the legal principles intended to form
the basis of the NIEO.

9

Each of these documents incorporated principles which constituted
a radical challenge to the existing international institutional structures,
and in particular to the GATT. The CERDS called for an expanded
55. Rafil Prebisch, Towards a New Trade Policy for Development: Report of
the Secretary-Generalof the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development,
U.N. ECON., U.N. Doc. E/CONF.46/3 at 11-19 (1964).
56. As Prebisch put it:
The imposing code of rules and principles drawn up at Havana and partially
embodied in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), does not
reflect a positive conception of economic policy in the sense of a rational
and deliberate design for influencing economic forces so as to change their
spontaneous course of evolution and attain clear objectives. On the contrary,
it seems to be inspired by a conception of policy which implies that the
expansion of trade to the mutual advantage of all merely requires the removal
of the obstacles which impede the free play of these forces in the world
economy. These rules and principles are also based on an abstract notion of
economic homogeneity which conceals the great structural differences between
industrial centers and peripheral countries with all their important implications. Hence, GATT has not served the developing countries as it has the
developed ones. In short, GATT has not helped to create the new order
which must meet the needs of development, nor has it been able to fulfill
the impossible task of restoring the old order.
Id. at 6.
57. Hudec, supra note 51, at 72.
58. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
supra note 2.
59. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 26.
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system of trade preferences, going far beyond the tentative steps of
the GATT regime taken a few years earlier with the authorization of
the Generalized System of Preferences. 0
B. ATTEMPTS AT ADAPTATION OF THE TRADE REGIME

While the radical program of the NIEO was never implemented,
the traditional institutions of the post war international economic
order did make at least one important concession in principle to the
developing countries. A rather mild but real derogation from the
GATT principle of non-discrimination was adopted by the GATT's
members in 1971, after several years of discussion within UNCTAD
and other fora. The GATT decision on the Generalized System of
Preferences (GSP) allowed developed countries to grant duty-free
treatment or other non-reciprocal tariff preferences to products from
developing countries for a trial period of ten years, 6' and a 1979
decision legitimized GSP arrangements indefinitely. 62 Since UNCTAD
I, developing countries have demanded trade preferences as necessary
in order to compensate for their disadvantage and permit their industrialization.63 The GSP permitted the developed members of the GATT
to grant trade preferences to developing countries, but it did not
require them to do so.
While most of the industrialized countries have established GSP
preference schemes since 1971,6 each country's scheme is different,
and many are quite complicated. This situation undermines the GSP's
ostensible goal of a simple, general and systematic preference scheme
benefiting developing countries. 65 In all cases, the scope of the preferences granted is limited, so that many developing country exports are
not covered by the GSP. As one might expect, UNCTAD has been
less than satisfied with the scope of the preferences granted as well as
60. Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States, supra note 26, at arts.
18-19.
61. Generalized System of Preferences, Decision of June 25, 1971, GATT, BISD
18th Supp. 25 (1972) (temporary waiver).
62. Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries, Decision of Nov. 28, 1979, GATT, BISD 26th Supp.
203 (1980).
63. Prebisch, supra note 55, at 34-39.
64. See 19 U.S.C. § 2461 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) (authorizing the United States
GSP scheme).

65. See Frances Williams, Developing Countries Look for Better Deal on Trade
- Why the GeneralizedSystem of Preferences is Regarded as only a Qualified Success,
FIN. TIMEs, May 21, 1992, at 6.
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with the ultimate benefit of the GSP for the developing countries.
that the utility and effectIndependent analysts have also concluded
67
minimal.
been
has
iveness of the GSP
Rail Prebisch's analysis of the trade problems of developing
countries motivated UNCTAD to call for changes in the regime
governing primary commodities as well. If problems with the prices
of primary commodities had resulted in unsatisfactory terms of trade
for developing countries, the latter would presumably benefit from
efforts to stabilize, and even support, the prices of these commodities.
Thus the NIEO Declaration called for a:
Just and equitable relationship between the prices of raw
materials, primary commodities, manufactured and semi-manufactured goods exported by developing countries and the
prices of raw materials, primary commodities, manufactures,
capital goods and equipment imported by them with the aim
of bringing about sustained improvement in their unsatisfactory
6
terms of trade and the expansion of the world economy. 1

The idea that world commodity prices should be fixed in order to
guarantee fair prices to exporters has never been acceptable to the
western industrialized countries, and their opposition to this idea, as
well as to the NIEO in general, is understandable. Undeniably the
concept of the NIEO as articulated in 1974 reflects many elements of
a planned economy, 69 and the call for the regulation of prices of
commodities and other goods in world trade is just one example of
this. 70 Price regulation of this type would be a formula for the
66. UNCTAD Special Committee on Preferences, Res. 6(IX) (1980) (noting that
the objectives of the GSP as set out in Conference Resolution 21(11) had not been
achieved, but concluding that the GSP should nonetheless be renewed beyond the
initial 10 year period).
67. J.M. Finger & Mordechai E. Kreinin, A Critical Survey of the New International Economic Order, 10 J. WORLD TRADE L. 493, 501 (1976).
68. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order,
supra note 2, art. 4(j).
69. See Norbert Horn, Normative Problems of a New International Economic
Order, 16 J. WORLD TRADE L. 338, 341 (1982).
70. The NIEO Declaration also calls for measures "improving the competitiveness of natural raw materials facing competition from synthetic substitutes." Declaration on the Establishment of a New International World Order, supra note 2, art.
4(m). Even some economists in the developed countries sympathetic to the poverty of
developing countries view this as an unacceptable prescription for interference with
both market price mechanisms and technological progress. See WMLLtAM LOEHR &
JOHN P. POWELOON, THREAT TO DEVELOPMENT: PITFALLS OF THE NIEO 14-23 (1983)
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international redistribution of wealth through the manipulation of
trade.7 But despite certain excesses of the NIEO, the developing
countries make a legitimate point when they complain that the volatility
of commodity prices makes economic growth and development extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the many developing countries
dependent on commodity exports as their principal means of foreign
exchange. Commodity prices have been subject to such drastic shortterm price fluctuations that even importing countries have recognized
the need to help stabilize these prices within realistic ranges reflecting
72
longer term market trends.

Global negotiations resulted in the 1980 agreement to create a
common fund for commodities,7 3 but the results have been disappointing. The fund is based on the idea that a large fund could link the
finances of the various commodity agreements which buy and sell a
particular primary commodity in an attempt to alleviate the short term
fluctuations in market prices. Assuming that some commodities will
go up as others go down, the use of a "common fund" to stabilize
the full range of key commodities seemed like a good idea. In practice,
the collapse of the individual commodity agreements has rendered the
already grossly underfunded common fund virtually useless. 7 4
Meanwhile, the terms of trade for primary commodity exports of
developing countries have continued to decline. According to the Food
and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the "level of real export prices
of agricultural, fishery and forestry products in 1992 was estimated to
be 26 percent below that at the start of the 1980s. ' '1 5 During this
(disputing Prebisch's methodology and his conclusion that the terms of trade for
commodities have been consistently deteriorating). See also id. at 23-26 (arguing that
increases in the prices of commodities would not be an efficient way to transfer
resources from the rich to the poor).

71. See ROBERT L. ROTHSTEIN, GLOBAL BARGAINING: UNCTAD AND THE QUEST
FOR A NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER 63 (1979) (noting that "[wihile UNCTAD

officials frequently denied any intention to transfer resources via higher prices (above
the trend), even outside analysts who were sympathetic to developing country demands
assumed that this was the .. .real objective.").
72. Id. at 124 (summarizing an unpublished paper about caucusing between
industrial countries prior to negotiations on the Common Fund for Commodities, and
noting that even as a rather "hard line" was being formulated there was widely shared
agreement among these countries that commodity price indexation was unworkable
and that only price stabilization made sense).
73. See Agreement Establishing the Common Fund for Commodities, June 27,
1980, 19 I.L.M. 896 (1980).
74. See Frances Williams, Millions of Dollars and Nothing to Spend it on-A
United Nations Fund in Crisis, FIN. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993, at 26.

75. FOOD AND AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION, COMMODITY REVIEW AND OUTLOOK

1992-1993 8 (1993).
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period, the real price of coffee and cocoa was down 70 percent, sugar
was down nearly 60 percent, and cotton and rubber were down nearly
50 percent. 76 The failure of economic clauses of international comand sugar was cited as one
modity agreements covering coffee, cocoa
77
decline.
this
for
explanations
of the key
The GSP and the Common Fund Agreement both represent
departures from a totally free market approach to international trade,
each designed to benefit the interests of developing countries. But the
Common Fund was never intended to prop up commodity prices
against the long term trend of the international market, and thus it
represents only an attempt to moderate the effect of that market and
not an effort to deny it.
One could argue in a similar fashion that while the GSP does
derogate from free trade principles of non-discrimination, in essence,
it represents an effort to maintain trade liberalization where practicable, while leaving open the possibility of some relief for the impossible
level of economic hardship which such trade liberalization can place
upon the economies and the people of the developing countries.
Unfortunately, neither the Common Fund nor the GSP has lived up
to the expectations of developing countries. 8
C. THE MULTIFIBER ARRANGEMENTS: DEROGATING FROM PRINCIPLE
TO THE DETRIMENT OF DEVELOPING COUNTRIES

While developing countries have been disappointed at the limited
success of the GSP, the Common Fund for Commodities and other
efforts to compensate for their structural disadvantage in the international system, they have been even more concerned about the special
trade disadvantages they have suffered as a result of the trade policies
of the industrialized countries. The most glaring example of this is the
Multifiber Arrangement (MFA). 9
76. Id.at 8.
77. Id. at 11.
78. Part IV (on Trade and Development) was also added to the GATT in
recognition of the need to accommodate the special trade problems of developing.
countries. See GATT Doc., L/2281 (Oct. 26, 1964); GATT Doc., L/2297 (Nov. 17,
1964); GATT, 13th Supp. BISD (1965). This part, composed of articles 36, 37 and
38, speaks of making the trade interests of developing countries a priority, but because
it has little substantive content it has been characterized as "hortatory" and without
JOHN H. JACKSON & WILLIAM
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1143 (1986).

legal implications. See

J.

DAVEY, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF

79. Arrangement Regarding International Trade in Textiles, Dec. 20, 1973, 25
U.S.T. 1001 [hereinafter MFA].
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As early as the 1950s, it became apparent that industrialized
countries were reluctant to accept much growth in their imports from
the developing countries, even if this might be the result of applying
free market principles. For example, in 1958, the GATT released a
report by liberal Harvard economist Gottfried Haberler, which blamed
the declining Third World trade share upon Northern trade policies
which created barriers to imports from developing countries by exploiting the many exceptions to the GATT free trade system.1 0 Early
UNCTAD studies established that Northern trade barriers prevented
imports of what were often the only goods which developing countries
had to export, i.e. primary commodities."' This restricted developing
country access to one of their most important sources of foreign
exchange, the very source which should be freely available to them
according to free trade theory.
International trade in textiles has long been a delicate issue in
relations between developed and developing countries. Since textile
fibers such as cotton and wool are primary commodities, they are
readily available in many developing countries, as is the relatively
unskilled labor necessary for transforming the fibers into garments.
But while many developing countries have a comparative advantage in
the production of these fibers and fiber products, the production of
fiber based garments is a traditional source of low wage and low skill
employment in industrialized countries. This creates political pressures
in the latter to resist imports of fibers from developing areas. In
response to these pressures, international trade in textiles has been
managed for over 30 years by a series of special arrangements outside
of the GATT framework.82 The most recent of these is the 1973
Multifiber Arrangement.
80. TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE: REPORT BY A PANEL OF EXPERTS 80-95
(1958). See also the discussion of this report in Craig N. Murphy, What the
Third
World Wants: An Interpretation of the Development and Meaning of the
New

InternationalEconomic Order Ideology, in THE
ZATIONS: PATTERNS AND INSIGHTS

POLITICS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANI-

230 (1989).
81. A 1968 UNCTAD report concluded that "the industrial centers are progressively excluding from their markets various commodities in which the peripheral
countries are fully competitive and for which the production costs of the
latter

countries are much lower than those for similar products in the centers." Towards a

Global Strategy for Development: Report of the Secretary-General of the United
Nations Conference on Trade and Development to the Second Session of the Conference, U.N. Commission on Trade and Development, at 16 U.N. Doc. TD/3/Rev.I,
(1968).
82. These included the Interim Arrangement Regarding International Trade in
Cotton Textiles, July 21, 1961, 12 U.S.T. 1674 and the Long-Term Arrangement
Regarding International Trade in Cotton Textiles, Feb. 9, 1962, 13 U.S.T. 2672.
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One stated purpose of the MFA was to achieve an expansion in
international trade in textile products and the progressive liberalization
of that trade.13 Another principal objective was "to further the economic and social development of developing countries and secure a
substantial increase in their export earnings from textile products and
to provide scope for a greater share for them in world trade in these
products. ' 8 4 Although the industrialized countries promised to allow
a 6 percent annual increase in the level of imports agreed to in the
associated bilateral agreements, 85 they failed to keep that promise.
Thus, by 1982, the developing countries participating in the arrangement had already come to the conclusion that it was steadily less
meeting its fundamental objectives of expanding trade and more and
more becoming an instrument restricting it.16 Developing country textile
exporters reluctantly agreed to renew the MFA inorder to avoid more
87
strongly protectionist legislation from the United States Congress.
It has proven to be difficult, and indeed so far impossible, to
wean the United States textile industry from the protection of the
MFA.88 Former Congressman Bill Franzel described the textile industry's appetite for protection by remarking that "[w]e've given them a
crutch and now they want a wheelchair and an iron lung ....

In

the United States domestic debate on textile imports, the effect of the
MFA and other textile import restrictions upon the developing countries is rarely mentioned.
Protection of the textile industry does not come without a cost to
other sectors of the United States economy. In addition to the MFA's
quotas limiting Third World textile imports, the United States also
83. MFA, supra note 79, art. 1(2).
84. MFA, supra note 79, art. 1(3).
85. MFA, supra note 79, Annex B, para. 3 (requiring at least a six percent
increase in allowable imports unless there is new evidence demonstrating that such a
rate of growth would "exacerbate the situation of a market disruption.").
86. See Inter-American Economic and Social Council Report, 7

INT'L TRADE

REP. 133 (Oct. 27, 1982).

87. See Nicholas Kristof, Great Textile Trade Debate, THE N.Y. TimEs, July 23

1985, § D, at 1.

88. The Uruguay Round did result in an agreement to phase out the MFA over
10 years. Agreement on Textiles and Clothing, MTN/FA Doc., Annex IA-5, pt. II,

Corr. 1, arts. 2(8), 9 (Dec. 15, 1993) [hereinafter Textile Agreement]. See also Peter
Behr, 117 Nations Representatives Approve Historic Trade Pact, THE WASH. POST,

Dec. 16, 1993, at A41 (noting that United States textile manufacturers had hoped for
a 15-year phase out, and that the head of the American Textile Manufacturers Institute
expressed disappointment with the outcome).
89. Leon Hadar, The Threat of No Tariffs, Bus. TrMEs, July 14, 1993, at 24.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

maintains high tariffs on textile imports, tariffs which burden United
States textile imports from Europe as well as those from developing
countries. 9° Through higher prices, United States consumers pay the
costs of these tariffs as well as for the MFA's protection. At global
trade talks in Tokyo in June of 1993, the European Community
demanded deeper cuts in United States textiles and apparel tariffs in
exchange for EC agreement to lower European tariffs on computers,
chips and other electronics products. United States trade Representative
Mickey Kantor rejected that trade-off, even though it could have
provided a tremendous boost to the United States computer industry
and other high-tech industries in this country which provide highwage, high-skill jobs; exactly the kinds of jobs which the Clinton
administration has said it wants to create. 9 The powerful alliance of
the United States textile industry, labor groups representing textile
workers, and lawmakers from key states were able to use its formidable
political clout to prevent that trade-off. Nonetheless, some trade-offs
between sectors of the United States economy are inevitable if global
trade negotiations are to be successful. Those sectors of the economy
which are weakest in global markets will naturally demand continued
protection, while the most dynamic and profitable sectors of the United
States economy will favor the removal of trade barriers. Economists
agree that the Multifiber Agreement costs the United States economy
millions of dollars each year, 92 but this information has not yet had
that much influence upon the political process in Washington. This
may be attributable to the fact that "the high-tech sector is still in its
political adolescence." 9a Ultimately, the Uruguay Round did result in
90. See OFFICE OF TARiFF AFFAIRS & TRADE AGREEMENTS, HARMONIZED TARIFF
SCHEDULE OF THE UNITED STATES chs. 50-63 (1992).
91. Peter Behr, Kantor Faces Choice Between Textiles and High-Tech,

THE

June 26, 1993, at Cl.
92. Exact estimates of this cost vary. See Jim Ostroff, Mills Blast New GA TT

WASH. POST,

Accord; But Importers, Stores Back It; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
DAILY NEWS REC., Dec. 16, 1993, Vol. 23, at 2 (quoting Tracy Mullin, the National

Retail Federation president as saying that the MFA adds $46 billion annually to

consumers' costs for buying apparel); Brittan Speech on Openness in World Trade
Body, THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY REPORT, Sept. 15, 1993, available in

LEXIS, Nexis Library, Wires File (Sir Leon Brittan, Trade Commissioner of the
European Union stating that "the interests of consumers must be taken much more
seriously in future trade policy" and that according to GATT figures the cost of the
MFA in the United States could be as much as $27 billion, or around $200-400 per
year for a 4 person household in current 1993 dollars).
93. Behr, supra note 91, at Cl (paraphrasing Jim Johnson, Director of Government Affairs for Apple Computer).
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an agreement to phase out the MFA over a period of 10 years'
D.

AID AND TRADE

The issues of international trade and foreign aid are closely linked,
especially from the perspective of the developing countries. Ral
Prebisch, has argued that developing countries have a right to foreign
aid due to the structural bias of the international trade order. After
noting that the terms of trade have deteriorated to the detriment of
the developing countries, Prebisch considers the ways in which the
can be mitigated:
effects of this phenomenon
I
There are various ways in which this can be done: by means
of commodity agreements, which not only improve prices but
also facilitate access to the markets of the industrial countries,
or by compensatory financing. These are in fact convergent
measures, the nature of which will be analyzed in the appropriate part of this report. Suffice it to say here that there are
difficulties but that they can be solved. However for this
technical discussion to be profitable, it must be preceded by a
political decision of the first importance, namely, a decision to
transfer, in one way or another, to the countries exporting
primary commodities the extra income accruing to the industrial countries as a result of the deterioration of the terms of
trade.
From a pragmatic point of view this means recognizing that
countries experiencing a deterioration of the terms of trade
have a prima facie claim upon additional resources-resources
over and above those which they would have received in the
normal course of events. 95
Even for those who do not accept this entitlement argument, the
fact remains that adjustment of the trade relationship between North
and South could in principle obviate any need for foreign aid. Former
Secretary of State George Shultz, speaking in Rio de Janeiro at a
conference sponsored by Brazilian business groups, explained that in
his view it has become evident that the solution to developing country
problems does not lie in financial transfers from rich countries to poor
countries. Developing countries must learn to produce and develop for
themselves. Shultz stressed that this can only be accomplished if the
developed countries trade more with developing countries even if this
94. Textile Agreement, supra note 88, arts. 2(8), 9.
95. Prebisch, supra note 55, at 16.
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does result in some loss of jobs and loss of some industries in the
former (rich) countries. 96
1.

Tied Aid
Foreign aid to developing countries comes in many forms, but
the most desirable type of aid for the recipient country is what is
known as Official Development Assistance (ODA). 97 Unlike other types
of aid such as commercial bank loans and export credits, ODA is
supposed to be granted on concessional terms and thus should not in
principle be linked to the recipient's trade policies. In practice, however, it frequently is. A 1992 report by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD), which groups together the
industrialized democracies, concluded that so called "mixed credits"
linking ODA and export credit financing should be banned. These
mixed credits make the ODA conditional on the export credits, and
their object is to assure that all or part of the aid funds sent abroad
will be spent to purchase exports from the granting state. The OECD
report notes that since the prices of the exports financed by these
credits average about 20 percent more than world prices for the same
products, they clearly have trade distorting effects. 98
Of course, ODA is not the only source of development finance.
Commercial bank loans were an important alternative source, especially during the 1970s, but there has been little net flow of commercial
bank lending to Latin America since shortly after Mexico first ceased
servicing the principal of its debt in 1982. 99 As a result, large scale
publicly financed projects must increasingly be replaced by private
sector financing, and equity financing is expected to become more
prevalent than debt financing1o0 Meanwhile, the IMF's role in man96. Shultz Warns that Failure of GA TT Will Set Back Trade, Harm Developing
Nations, 10 INT'L TRADE REP. 203 (Feb. 3, 1993).

97. Official Development Assistance (ODA) consists of net disbursements of
loans and grants made on concessional financial terms by official agencies of the
members of the Development Assistance Committee (DAC) of the Organization for
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and members of the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), to promote economic development and
welfare. WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 253 (1990).
98. OECD Calls for Tighter Rules on Export Credit and Aid, 16 INT'L TRADE
REP. 1638 (Sept. 23, 1992).

99. See Jon H. Sylvester, Impracticability, Mutual Mistake and Related Contractual Bases for Equitably Adjusting the External Debt of Sub-Saharan Africa, 13
J. INT'L L. Bus. 258, 287 (1992); Connie M. Friesen, The Regulation and Supervision
of InternationalLending: Part II, 20 INT'L LAW. 153, 192 (1986).
100. ABA Program Stresses Changes in Financingfor Latin American Projects
in the 1990s, 9 INT'L TRADE REP. 1872 (Oct. 28, 1992).
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aging the international debt crisis has increased that organization's
influence over the developing countries.'10
2.

StructuralAdjustment

The term structural adjustment refers to the process by which
economic factors such as land, labor and capital are reallocated within
a country as it adapts in order to function more efficiently as part of
the global economy. Structural adjustment is required by the liberalization of international trade as each country moves to specialize in
the production of those goods which it can produce most efficiently,
and abandons the production of those goods which it cannot produce
as efficiently. Because the process usually entails unemployment, the
closing of inefficient industries, and other such dislocations in the
short run, this adjustment tends to be politically sensitive in all
countries.
Inefficient industries which have benefitted from protection in the
past and labor unions representing workers in those industries may
object that structural adjustment saddles them with an undue burden.
Labor, in particular, tends to turn inward and demand protection
from foreign competition and foreign workers. Because the internationalization of capital permits investment abroad as well as at home,
business interests are generally in favor of a more open trade system.lof
Except for those industries directly affected, the burden of structural
a result, trade policy debates
adjustment is not borne by business.0 As
3
based.1
class
have sometimes become
101. See Robichek, supra note 15, at 143-54.
102. Consumer activist Ralph Nader has criticized the Uruguay Round's result in
the following terms:
It's an old game: when fifty years ago the textile workers of Massachusetts
demanded higher wages and safer worker conditions, the industry moves its
factories to the Carolinas and Georgia. If California considers enacting
environmental standards in order to make it safer for people to breathe,
business threatens to shut down and move to another state.
The Uruguay Round is crafted to enable corporations to play this game at
the global level, to pit country against country in a race to see who can set
the lowest wage levels, the lowest environmental standards, the lowest
consumer safety standards. It is a game that has its winners and losers
determined before it even gets underway: workers, consumers and communities lose; big business wins.
Testimony February 2, 1994 Ralph Nader House Ways and Means/Trade Uruguay
Trade Negotiations, FEDERAL DOCUMENT CLEARING HOUSE CONGRESSIONAL TESTIMONY,
Feb. 2, 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, CNGTST File.

103. Id.
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But more open trading cannot be achieved without some short
term dislocations as less competitive producers are forced to close by
market forces and foreign competition. International financial institutions have tried to help developing countries to deal with this painful
process, in particular by helping poor and displaced workers to obtain
new employment. 0 The World Bank, for example, which traditionally
prefers to finance specific economic development projects such as
roads and hydroelectric dams, also makes structural and sectoral
adjustment loans intended to ease the transition towards forms of
economic activity which will be competitive in more open international
markets. 0 1 Within a relatively wealthy industrialized country such as
the United States, the national government will often feel a responsibility for acting to cushion the effects of structural adjustment upon
the poorer segments of society. Limited trade adjustment assistance of
this type is still available to United States workers under the 1974
Trade Act, 06 and President Clinton (as he signed NAFTA into law)
promised to work with Congress to create the world's best worker
training and retraining system. 0 7 Workers, however, are understandably skeptical about such promises.
E.

THE ROLE OF THE NEWLY INDUSTRIALIZED COUNTRIES (NICS)

1.

The Graduation Issue
Among the most sensitive issues raised by the GSP preference
scheme is the distribution of the benefits among developing countries;
104. The World Bank observed that:
the effect of economic crisis and consequent adjustment on the poordepression of output, employment, and consumption; falling terms of trade
for those who previously benefitted from subsidies and other forms of
protection from market forces ....
These transitional costs are-at least in
the aggregate-largely unavoidable ....
For well planned and timely ad-

justment, what outweighs the inevitable costs are the long term benefits of
the more rapid and viable growth that results. to mitigate the immediate
pain, social expenditures should be refocused, to the extent possible, towards
the poor, and cost effective compensatory programs can be introduced,
particularly in the areas of nutrition and employment.
THE WORLD BANK, ANNUAL REPORT 68 (1988).
105. See id. at 65-67 (noting that the World Bank has been increasingly concentrating its adjustment lending on sector-adjustment loans which focus on restructuring
of investment programs, policies, and institutions for a specific sector of the borrower's
economy).
106. 19 U.S.C. §§ 210-2495 (1988 & Supp. IV). See also RICHARD CARBAUGH,
INTERNATIONAL EcONOMICS 135 (1989).
107. NAFTA Signing Ceremony, CNN TRANSCRIPT No. 473-11, Dec. 8, 1993,
available in LEXIS, News Library, CNN File. See also infra note 235.
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closely related is the question of how to determine when a particular
developing country no longer needs these preferences. Underlying both
is the fact that the developing countries are a very diverse group
including desperately poor fourth world states such as Chad (GNP per
capita $160), oil rich OPEC states such as Kuwait ($13,400), more
typical non-oil developing states such as Paraguay ($1,180) and Newly
08
Industrialized Countries (NICs) such as Singapore ($9,070).
In 1987, the "Four Tigers" of Asia, South Korea, Taiwan, Hong
Kong and Singapore received almost 60 percent of the benefits from
the United States GSP scheme leaving only 40 percent for the other
136 eligible countries, 109 most of which are considerably less affluent.
This remarkable concentration of the benefits of the GSP raised serious
questions of equity." 0 Moreover, since each of these countries had
already been lauded by the United States as a success story of free
enterprise economic development, preferences in their favor became
difficult to justify."' In theory, former developing countries that
achieve a certain level of development, as have these NICs, should
"graduate" into the GATT's ordinary regime of non-discriminatory
trade relations. Accordingly, the Reagan Administration decided in2
scheme."
1988 to graduate the four tigers from the United States GSP
The Trade Minister of Singapore, Mr. Lee Hsien Loong called the
move a foul blow, and others suggested that the tigers were being
3
unfairly penalized for their success."
Few would dispute that the successful completion of development
should in principle eliminate the need for these trade preferences, but
some observers suspected that the tigers were graduated not so much
because of their newly achieved levels of development as because of
the level of their trade surpluses with the United States. Together they
were responsible for 22 percent of the United States trade deficit

108. See WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 178 (1990) (setting out GNP of various

countries in 1988 dollars).
109. Dori J. Yang et al., Can Asia's Four Tigers be Tamed?, Bus. WK., Feb.
15, 1988, at 46.

110. "The various GSP schemes may have helped some poor people in the
middle-income countries to the extent that the expanded exports were labor-intensive
in production, but the poor in low-income countries cannot have gained much at all.

The clear tendency to exclude agricultural products from the schemes strengthens this
conclusion." WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 108, at 124.
11. See Yang, supra note 109, at 46.
112. Happy Graduation, Tigers!, THE CHUSTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Feb. 4, 1988, at
15.

113. See Yang, supra note 109, at 46.
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during the first 11 months of 1987,114 and protectionist sentiment in
the United States Congress was undoubtedly a factor in their removal
from the GSP.
2. The New Developing Country Trend Towards Trade
Liberalization
According to the theory of hegemonic stability, a liberal trading
order can only be maintained for as long as there is a dominant
economic power or "economic hegemon," willing to pay the costs of
that open order by permitting large amounts of imports into its own
open markets as an incentive to the other states to open theirs." 5 If
this theory is correct, and if it turns out that the United States is no
longer willing to accept large trade deficits as the price of opening
international markets, the prospect of further liberalization of international trade is greatly diminished. It is possible, however, that the
bloc of Newly Industrialized Countries'l6 (NICs) which strongly favor
liberal trade may add a new and important element to the equation.
All developing countries seek to avoid the type of discriminatory
treatment to which they are sometimes subject as exemplified by the
MFA, discussed above." 7 The NICs in particular have a clear long
term interest in the reduction of trade barriers between all countries.
This is true not only because they have graduated from the GSP trade
preference scheme, but more generally because they have achieved a
new status as major exporting countries.
Recently, there has been a broad movement among developing
countries and the new economies in transition (e.g. Poland) towards
trade liberalization," 8 but ironically this is occurring just as the commitment of the developed market-economy countries to liberal trade
has been called into question by the many difficulties encountered
during the completion of the Uruguay Round of GATT negotiations." 9
114. Yang, supra note 109, at 46.
115. See Arthur A. Stein, The Hegemon's Dilemma: Great Britain, the United
States, and the InternationalEconomic Order, 38 INT'L ORG. 355, 355-56 (1984).
116. NICs are sometimes referred to as Newly Industrialized Economies (NIEs).
China prefers this term and points out that not all NIEs are countries, since two key
NICs, Hong Kong and Taiwan, are technically part of China. See Karl Schoenberger,
The Pacific Summit; Buzzwords; Talkin'PacificRim: Guide to the Groups and Lingo,

L.A.

TIMES,

Nov. 16, 1993, at 10.

117. See notes 79-94 and accompanying text.

118. UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND

DEVELOPMENT REPORT

59 (1991).

119. Lindley H. Clark, Our Do-It Yourself Trade Policy,
1989, 9 1, at 12.

WALL ST. J., Sept. 22,

1994:347]

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE

375

In 1992, the GATT reported that 51 of the 63 countries which had
announced trade liberalization measures since 1986 were either developing or transition economies."10
According to a report prepared by the Common Fund for Commodities, "protectionism ... is a plague on both consumers and
producers alike, and remains the single major threat to commodity
development strategy implementation."1 21 The report then concluded
that "[rleducing tariffs, and completing the Uruguay [R]ound, is
therefore, a first and key priority, not only for the United States and
Europe, but foremost for Africa."' 22
III.
A.

THE ENVIRONMENTAL REVOLUTION

THE CONCEPT

The experience gained with environmental problems has necessitated a redefinition of many basic economic concepts. An industry or
development project which appears at first glance to be profitable or
desirable may in fact have enormous hidden costs in terms of damage
to the environment. A revised economic analysis is required at both
the national and the international level to internalize the costs of
environmental damage. The procedures of international economic
institutional structures such as the World Bank and the GATT must
increasingly be reworked to reflect what is learned about effects upon
the environment in the planning and implementation of policies and
projects. But this evolution has been resisted by some as inconsistent
with the narrowly conceived technical mandates of the organizations
concerned, and has at 23times even been dismissed as an inappropriate
form of politicization.
At the international level, efforts to achieve cooperation for the
protection of the global environment have built upon the notion of
120. Frances Williams, GATT Disquiet at Slower World Trade Growth, FIN.

TIMES, Mar. 18, 1992, § I, at 6.

121. Protectionism Threatens Commodity Prices-Report, REUTERS LIBRARY REPORT, Oct. 25, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File.

122. Id.
123. See BARTRAM S. BROWN, THE UNITED STATES AND THE PoLrrIcIZATION OF
THE WORLD BANK: ISSUES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POLICY 207, 237-40 (1992)
(concluding that the World Bank's functional utility as a cooperative international
organization has been improved by environmental reforms even though those reforms
began largely as a result of U.S. legislation which exerted strong unilateral pressure
upon that institution).
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what may be referred to as the "global environmental commons.' 1 24
The essence of this notion is expressed in Principle 2 of the Stockholm
Declaration adopted by the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in 1972, which states that "[t]he natural resources of the earth,
including the air, water, land, flora, fauna, and especially representative samples of natural ecosystems, must be safeguarded for the benefit
of present and future generations through careful planning or management, as appropriate." 125 This concept has developed quite naturally
as part of a succession of related notions endorsed by the international
community such as the idea that outer space, the moon and celestial
bodies "shall be the province of all mankind,"'1 6 and that the sea-bed
and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction "are the common heritage of mankind."' 27
The notion of the "global commons" is relatively new and is still
to some extent an "aspirational" normative concept. It is not yet well
established as part of positive international law. 28 But as the treaties
and declarations referred to above clearly indicate, this notion is
gaining status as a principle or at least as a set of generally recognized
values. The more specific concept of the global environmental commons differs from many other aspirational concepts in international
law in that it has recently been invoked largely by industrialized
countries against developing countries. 129 This has occurred because
most of the world's rain forests, most of the world's biodiversity, and
therefore much of the terrestrial global environmental commons, is to

124. The term "global commons"

is used more frequently than is "global

environmental commons," but the latter and more specific term is more apposite here.
125. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human
Environment, June 16, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 48/14 (1972), reprinted in 11
I.L.M. 1416 (1972).

126. Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States in the Exploration
and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies, Jan. 27,
1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410 (entered into force for the United States Oct. 10, 1967).
127. Declaration of the Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor, and
the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, Dec. 17, 1970, U.N.
GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1971), reprinted in 10
I.L.M. 220 (1971). The concept is reaffirmed with regard to these resources in Article

136 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. United Nations

Convention on the Law of the Sea, Dec. 10, 1982, U.N. Doc. A/CONF 62/122,
reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).

128. See LYNTON K. CALDWELL, INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY 257,

258-302 (1990) (reviewing the developing principle of the "international commons.").

129. The opposite was true, for example, of the aspirational norms asserted as

part of the call for a NIEO. See supra notes 68-70 and accompanying text.
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be found within the territory of developing states.' 30 It is not surprising
then, that some leaders of these states feel threatened by the notion
that protecting these resources should be seen as a matter of global
concern which is subject to international law.
Opposed to the thesis of a global environmental commons is the
antithesis of state sovereignty. This term clearly has varied usages,
meaning many things to many people. For developing countries,
"sovereignty" is a rallying cry that appeals to popular resentment of
a perceived domination by the United States or another industrialized
economic power. 3 ' Expressions of concern from these latter countries
about the need to preserve the environment within the territory of
developing states are frequently perceived as yet another attempt by
the North to intervene in the South and to impose unfair restrictions
upon its path to development. 3 2 Some Western economists apparently
agree. Former World Bank Chief Economist Lawrence Summers once
may be a luxury only
suggested that protection of the environment
33
afford.
can
countries
high-income
The international community has attempted to resolve the clash
on a theoretical level by invoking the concept of "sustainable development."' 3 4 Sustainable development can be viewed as a sort of
"synthesis" concept which attempts to reconcile the thesis of the
global environmental commons with the anti-thesis of state sovereignty.
In principle it refers to an evolved concept of development, which
presumably must be in the interest of developing countries, but which
also takes into account environmental concerns.
This concept was the central focus of the 1987 report of the
35
World Commission on Environment and Development (WCED).
The chairperson of the WCED was Prime Minister Gro Harlem
Brundtland of Norway, and it is generally referred to as the "Brundt130. Presidential Candidate Proposes Royalties for Regions with Exceptional
Biodiversity, 16 INT'L ENV'T. REP. CURRENT REP. 955 (1993).
131. See Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, G.A.
Res. 1803, U.N. GAOR, 17th Sess. 1194th plen. mtg., Agenda Item 39, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/1803 (XVII) (1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963).
132. Developing Countries Remain Firm in Call for Funds, Technology from
Rich, 15

INT'L ENV'T. REP. CURRENT REP.

234 (1992).

133. See Let Them Eat Pollution, THE ECONOMIST, Feb. 8, 1992, at 66 (reproducing the text of a memo circulated by Lawrence at the World Bank in which he
argues that "the demand for a clean environment for aesthetic and health reasons is
likely to have a very high income elasticity.").
134. See infra notes 135-40 and accompanying text.
135. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1987).
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land Commission." The Secretary-General of the United Nations asked
that Commission "to propose long-term environmental strategies for

achieving sustainable development by the year 2000 and beyond." The
WCED defined "sustainable development" as "development that meets
the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future
generations to meet their own needs." 13 6 As Lothar Gundling points

out "[t]his definition clearly shows that the debate on "sustainable
development" is, in fact, a discourse on our responsibility to future
generations." '37 Other formulations of sustainable development are
generally to the same effect.1 18 Underlying each definition is the

growing trend toward recognition of what Edith Brown Weiss refers
to as temporal rights related to intergenerational equity. 39
The WCED proposed a set of legal principles for "sustainable

development,"'40 and suggested that a global convention on "environment and development" be prepared on the basis of those principles.

This led to the United Nations Conference on the Environment and
Development held in Rio during the summer of 1992, at which a

number of international environmental agreements were endorsed.
B. IMPLEMENTING THE NEW ENVIRONMENTAL ANALYSIS

1. Aversion of States to InternationalRegulation
Even after environmental concepts have in principle been accepted
as relevant to the broader economic issues faced by states and ad-

dressed by international institutions such as the World Bank and the
GATT, many disagreements may persist concerning their practical
136. Id.at 43.
137. Lothar Gundling, Agora: What Obligation Does Our Generation Owe to

the Next? An Approach to Global Environmental Responsibility: Our Responsibility
To Future Generations, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 207, 208 (1990).
138. John Atcheson, The Department Of Risk Reduction Or Risky Business, 21

L. 1375, 1395-96 (1991) ("EPA counted some sixty-five definitions of sustainable development. But while economists and purists argue the fine points, there is a
remarkable consistency on the key ideas. Sustainable development, at its simplest,
involves two concepts. First the 'burn rate' of renewable and nonrenewable resources
must be managed to assure a steady state, or to assure that future generations will
have an equivalent resource base. Second, the assimilative capacity of the commons
must be managed so that their quality is not compromised.").
139. See EDITH B. WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL
ENVTL.

LAW, COMMON PATRIMONY, AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 115 (1989).
140. OUR COMMON FUTURE, supra note 135, at 348. See also EXPERTS GROUP
ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW OF THE WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVEL-

OPMENT, ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT

(1987).
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application. One of the largest obstacles to effective international
action on the environment is the general aversion which states have
towards international regulation of any kind.
Protection of the "global environmental commons" requires international cooperation at the expense of national freedom of action,
and many states are reluctant to accept the necessary limitations. 14 ,
This is especially true of developing states which are often concerned
about maintaining their freedom of action in today's world as much
as they are about achieving economic development. The notion that
apply to
certain minimal international environmental standards should
142
threatening.
as
seen
frequently
is
process
development
the
2. Issues of Decision-Making and the Asymmetrical Application of
Environmental Norms
The World Bank and regional development banks such as the
Inter-American Development Bank do not make loans to economically
developed countries, and thus any environmental policies they adopt
will apply only within developing areas. Since the mid 1980s these
banks have undergone a "greening" process which has led them to reevaluate their lending operations in light of environmental considerations . 43 This process of transformation was long overdue, but the
141. See Lynton K. Caldwell, Beyond Environmental Diplomacy: The Changing
Structure of International Cooperation, in INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY:

THE

MANAGEMENT AND RESOLUTION OF TRANSFRONTIER ENVIRONMENTAL PROB-

13, 16 (1988).
142. Edith B. Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,
102 YALE L.J. 2123, 2134 (1993).
143. See THE WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
FISCAL 1990 11-12 (1990) (describing the development of that institution's environmental awareness).
It became apparent that the Bank's response did not match the changing
realities either in the degree of effort devoted to environmental matters or in
the approaches actually used. This, combined with a few well-publicized
cases in which Bank projects actually had negative environmental consequences-such as contributing to the destruction of tropical rain forests and
posing threats to wildlife, indigenous people, and established human settlements-prompted the institution to rethink and adjust its policies toward
environmental management. In particular, Bank management decided to
bring environmental concerns more systematically into the mainstream of its
LEMS

operations ....

Since it is now recognized that sound environmental management is
fundamental to the development process, the Bank's new policy emphasizes
the need to make environmental issues an integral part of all its activities. In
practice, environmental considerations are now being addressed through a
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change in policy has met with resistance both within those institutions
and among their borrowers.'" While this greening process is far from
complete, it has already resulted in the application of "environmental
conditionality," i.e. lending is now conditioned on the satisfaction of
certain environmental criteria by the borrowers as well as upon the
satisfaction of more traditional economic criteria. 45 The result is a
special environmental regime applicable to borrowers from the MDBs
which is more strict than the incipient environmental regime applicable
to all states under general international law. The asymmetrical regime 46
created by the application of environmental conditionality parallels the
asymmetrical application of economic conditionality by the MDBs and
by the IMF, as discussed above.
This asymmetry is mitigated, to some extent, because developed
states are increasingly being called upon to accept a share of financial
responsibility for sustainable development. In practice, sustainable
development requires both financial and technical assistance for developing countries, and thus the acceptance of this notion by industrialized countries is an implicit acknowledgment of their responsibility
47
to help.1

Id.

continuum of activities that range from a series of country studies of
environmental strategy-including country environmental action plans and
regional studies-to country economic and sector work, project and adjustment lending, and evaluation.

144. See

STEPHAN SCHWARTZMAN, BANKROLLING DISASTERS: INTERNATIONAL DE-

4 (1986) (Sierra Club publication
criticizing the environmental record of the World Bank and the other Multilateral
Development Banks (MDBs), noting that there is evidence that these banks often fail
to act on their own formally adopted environmental policies and that as a result some
MDB projects cause serious environmental and social problems).
145. See THE WORLD BANK AND THE ENVIRONMENT: FIRST ANNUAL REPORT
FISCAL 1990, supra note 143, at 49 (explaining that during fiscal year 1990, 50% of
all World Bank projects approved had an environmental component, and that with
the increased emphasis on the environment monitoring and evaluation functions have
become more important). See also Multilateral Lending Organizations Insisting on
VELOPMENT BANKS AND THE GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT

Environmental Impact Studies, 17 INT'L ENV'T REP.

CURRENT REP.

71 (1994).

146. Asymmetrical legal obligations may not always be a bad thing. It has been
argued that in negotiating multilateral environmental agreements, it may at times be
preferable to set up an asymmetrical regime providing for varying obligations for
different states rather than settling for multilateral agreements based on the lowest
common denominator of acceptable regulation. See Peter H. Sand, Lessons Learned
in Global Environmental Governance, 18 B. C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 213, 224-25
(1991).

147. See Ved P. Nanda, International Environmental Protection and Developing
Countries' Interests: The Role of International Law, 26 TEX. INT'L L.J. 497, 501-02
(1991).
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Thus in a real sense, the environmental obligations of developing
states which are guardians of a large part of the terrestrial global
environmental commons are conditioned upon the fulfillment by developed states of their own responsibility to help financially. This
principle is recognized in the Biodiversity Treaty signed at the Rio
Convention which explicitly provides that "[t]he extent to which
developing country Parties will effectively implement their commitments under this Convention will depend on the effective implementation by developed country Parties of their commitments under this
Convention related to financial resources and transfer of technol1 48
ogy. '
C.

INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE ENVIRONMENT

Just as the World Bank has been obliged to refine its operations
in light of the new environmental consciousness, so too must the
international trade order be modified. The environmental issues of
sustainability, intergenerational equity, and the global commons are
as relevant to international trade as they are to development. Unfortunately, even at the United Nations Conference on the Environment
and Development (UNCED), where the environment was the central
focus, very little attention was given to the effect of environmental
issues upon international trade.'4 9 These matters were largely left to
the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations under the GATT.
It is doubtful if environmental concerns could ever have been
effectively integrated into the original GATT framework. The objective
of GATT negotiations has always been to reduce and eliminate barriers
to international trade, but efforts to preserve the environment may
require some form of environmentally based trade restrictions. The
environmental imperative is so compelling that it would be foolish to
insist that trade must be sacrosanct and totally free from environmental
restrictions. The task of determining how environmental protection
and trade liberalization can best be reconciled will now fall to the new
World Trade Organization 5 ° and its Committee on Trade and the
Environment. '

148. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development: Convention
on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992, art. 20, para. 4, reprinted
in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992).
149. See Konrad Von Moltke, The Last Round: The General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade in Light of the Earth Summit, 23 ENVTL. L. 519 (1993).
150. The Preamble to the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization
prominently recognizes the importance of environmental concerns.
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The Dangers of "Green Protectionism" and "Eco-Imperialism'"

Once it is recognized that environmental standards should be
applied in some way to international trade, there is an inherent danger

that states will use environmental concerns as a pretext for limiting
imports. International environmental concerns are real and legitimate,
but their invocation as a rationale for limiting imports may in some
cases turn out to be a form of "green protectionism." One way to
minimize this type of protectionism is to develop and apply clear

international standards on the environment which can at least help to

assure that a genuine environmental purpose is being served by any

such limitations imposed on trade. There is still a long way to go,
however, in the development of these standards, as will be discussed

below.
Perhaps even more controversial than green protectionism is the
matter of "eco-imperialism," i.e. the extension of the jurisdiction of
one state to environmental matters occurring on the territory of another
state. Because of historically based concerns about their sovereignty,

developing countries are particularly sensitive about extraterritorial
environmental regulation."' Nevertheless, there is a policy argument
to be made in its favor. Essentially, the argument is that due to the
weakness of the international environmental regime and the difficulty
of obtaining the adherence of all states to strict environmental standards, extraterritorial regulation by states with strong environmental

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavor
should be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full
employment and a large and steadily growing volume of real income and
effective demand, and expanding the production and trade in goods and
services, while allowing for the optimal use of the world's resources in
accordance with the objective of sustainable development, seeking both to
protect and preserve the environment and enhance the means for doing so in
a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at different
levels of economic development.
Agreement Establishing the Multilateral Trade Organization, pmbl., 33 I.L.M. 15
(1994).

151. Frances Williams, First Steps to 'Green the Gatt'-A Look at Preparations
for a Negotiating Programme for Trade, Environment and Sustainable Development
after Uruguay, THE FIN. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1994, at 7.
152. See EDITORS OF THE HARVARD LAW REVIEW, TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL
ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 146-47 (1992) (noting that extraterritorial regulation refers to

both "extraterritorial legislation", i.e., "the application of one state's statutes and
regulations to activities occurring within another country's territory" and to "extraterritorial adjudication", i.e., "the use of courts (usually United States courts) to
resolve common law disputes, such as private torts, that arise out of activities carried
on in foreign territory.").
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15 3
regimes is in many instances the best hope for effective legal action.
Arguments against extraterritorial environmental regulation focus upon
the fact that it can disrupt the economic growth and development of
other countries, 54 and more generally, that it undermines the interests
and the sovereignty of the other states involved.' 55 This, of course, is
exactly why developing countries feel so threatened by extraterritorial
legislative regulation. When the legislation concerned acts as an impediment to international trade, it may arguably be inconsistent with
international trade agreements as well as with general principles of
jurisdiction under international law.
Until now, international trade agreements themselves have not
been used to create environmental laws, rather, they have been invoked
to regulate the use of trade measures for environmental purposes. The
1991 GATT Tuna Panel Decision is a case in point, and it demonstrates
how unsuited the GATT framework is to deal with environmental
issues.

2.

The Marine Mammals Protection Act

The United States Congress passed the Marine Mammals Protection Act (MMPA) in 1972 to help maintain certain species of mammals
as functioning elements of the ecosystem and to prevent them from
diminishing below their optimal sustainable population. 15 6 The parts
of the MMPA governing the incidental taking of marine mammals in
the course of commercial fishing have the ambitious stated goal "that
the incidental kill or serious injury of marine mammals permitted in
the course of commercial fishing be reduced to insignificant levels
approaching a zero mortality and serious injury rate."' 5 7 These provisions have generated a great deal of controversy as applied to the
imported products of foreign commercial fishing.
Many dolphin perish in the course of commercial tuna fishing.
This is especially true in the eastern tropical Pacific Ocean area (ETP),
the only part of the world where dolphins and tuna are known to
153. See id. at 145-46.
154. See id. at 159-60.
155. See Jagdish Bhagwati, American Rules, Mexican Jobs, THE N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 24, 1993, § A, at 21 (noting that while it is both reasonable and within United
States jurisdictional powers to legislate environmental and labor standards for the
activities of United States companies in Mexico, it is unreasonable to expect Mexican
regulations to match those of the United States in each industry).
156. Pub. L. No. 92-522, 86 Stat. 1027 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§
1371-1407).
157. 16 U.S.C. 1371(a)(2) (1992).
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swim so very closely together that commercial fishermen routinely
locate schools of tuna by finding and chasing dolphins on the ocean
surface. These dolphins are then encircled with purse-seine nets to
catch the tuna underneath, and as the nets are drawn in many dolphin
are ensnared in them and/or trapped below the surface where they
suffocate.
The MMPA and its implementing regulations set strict limits upon
the number of dolphins which can be incidentally killed by persons
and vessels subject to United States jurisdiction, and provides for
various penalties, including forfeiture of cargo, for violations of these
regulations.158 It also states that "the Secretary of the Treasury shall
ban the importation of commercial fish or products from fish which
have been caught with commercial fishing technology which results in
the incidental kill or incidental serious injury of ocean mammals in
excess of United States standards."' 5 9 Special sections of the MMPA
prohibit the importation of yellowfin tuna from the ETP unless the
Secretary of Commerce finds that the harvesting country has a program
regulating the taking of mammals comparable to that of the United
States. 160 Amendments to the MMPA passed in 1985 restricted executive discretion and instituted a mandatory ban.' 6' As might have been
expected, foreign reaction to this legislation has been quite negative.
Under the MMPA, the burden is on the exporting government to
establish the existence of a qualifying program. 62 Thus, when Mexico
was unable to certify that its ETP fleet had complied with the
requirements of the MMPA, the United States government banned the
importation of Mexican tuna. 63 After consultations failed to resolve
the dispute, Mexico filed a complaint with the GATT, and a GATT
dispute resolution panel was formed.164
158. The implementing regulations were codified at Part 216 of Title 50 CFR
(1990). Regulations on commercial fishing appear at 50 CFR § 216.24 (1990).

159. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2) (1992).
160. 16 U.S.C. § 1371(a)(2)(B) (1992).

161. Marine Mammal Protection Act Amendments of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100711 (codified in various provisions of 16 U.S.C. sections 1361-1407). See also Steven
J. Porter, The Tuna Dolphin Controversy: Can the GATT Become Environment
Friendly, 5 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 91, 94-95 (1992).
162. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1992).
163. After a suit by environmentalists, a U.S. District Court banned the importation of ETP tuna except where the Secretary of Commerce had made a finding that
the exporting country had complied with the MMPA. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher,
746 F. Supp. 964 (N.D. Cal. 1990). After some hesitation by the executive, the import
ban was reaffirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Earth Island Inst. v. Mosbacher, 929 F.2d
1449, 1451 (9th Cir. 1991).
164. GATT: Dispute Settlement Panel Report on United States Restrictions on
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Mexico argued that the MMPA violated several different articles
of the GATT, including Article XI prohibiting quantitative restrictions,
Article XIII prohibiting trade discrimination against a specific geographic area (in this case the ETP), and Article III requiring national

treatment in internal regulation.165 Mexico suggested that since the
MMPA imposed extra burdens against foreign suppliers of tuna and

banned imports from those who failed to meet these requirements, the
ban was in essence a form of protectionist policy. 66 Additionally,
Mexico objected to the extraterritorial application of United States
restrictions to the fishing fleets of other GATT parties.1 67 Mexico was
thus complaining of both "green protectionism" and of "eco-imperi-

alism.'
3.

GA TT Tuna Panel Decision (1991)

The Panel Report found that the enforcement of the MMPA's
ban on Mexican tuna sales in the United States was indeed a prohibited
quantitative restriction as argued by Mexico, and not an internal

regulation enforced upon products at the border as argued by the
United States. 61 It ruled that the United States could not restrict tuna

imports based on the production method used if the product itself was
not affected. 69 The Panel reasoned that the enforcement of United
States tuna harvesting regulations upon Mexican tuna was based on
the process by which the product was created and not on the nature
70
of the product itself.

Imports of Tuna, GATT Doc. DS21/R, § 1.1 (1991), reprinted in 30 I.L.M. 1594
(1991) [hereinafter Panel Report].
165. Id. §§ 3.1-3.5.
166. The Panel Report notes Mexico's complaint that "discrimination applied
against countries which fish in the ETP (which under the MMPA included the Mexican
coasts and Exclusive Economic Zone) and benefitted the other parts of the world
where tuna is also fished and to which the United States fleet had largely moved in
recent years. Only after the United States fleet moved to other waters were more
restrictive requirements imposed in 1988 for the protection of dolphin in the ETPbut not for the new fishing grounds of the United States fleet." Id. § 3.14.
167. "Mexico stated that the average rates of incidental taking and other MMPA
provisions for tuna caught in the ETP represented a unilateral imposition by the
United States of extraterritorial restrictions on fishing by other contracting parties in
their own economic zones, under the pretext of protecting natural resources located
abroad." Id. § 3.48.
168. Id. § 5.14.
169. Id.
170. "The Panel noted that the MMPA regulates the domestic harvesting of
yellowfin tuna to reduce the incidental taking of dolphin, but that these regulations
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The Panel considered the argument that the ban must be allowed
under Article XX of the GATT. This Article appears on its face as
though it could accommodate the need for environmental protection., 7
The United States had argued that the ban on certain tuna imports
from Mexico and the relevant parts of the MMPA were justified by
Article XX(b) because they served solely the purpose of protecting
dolphin life and health.' Both were said to be "necessary" within
the meaning of that provision because there was no alternative measure
reasonably available to the United States to protect dolphin life and
health outside its jurisdiction.' 73
Mexico did not consider Article XX(b) to be applicable to measures imposed to protect the life or health of animals outside the
jurisdiction of the contracting party taking those measures, and it
argued that the measures were not necessary because international cooperation between the countries concerned was available to the United
States as an alternative means for protecting dolphin lives or health in
a manner consistent with the General Agreement. 7 4 In essence, but
without actually using the term, Mexico characterized the extraterritorial application of the MMPA as eco-imperialism, 7 s and the GATT

could not be regarded as being applied to tuna products as such because they would
not directly regulate the sale of tuna and could not possibly affect tuna as a product."
Id. § 5.14; see also id. § 5.15.
171. GATT, supra note 11, art. XX. Article XX reads in part as follows:
Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination
between countries where the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction
on international trade, nothing in this Agreement shall be construed to
prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party of measures
...(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; ...
(g) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic
production or consumption.
GATT, supra note 11, art. XX.
172. Panel Report, supra note 164, §§ 3.33 and 3.36.
173. Panel Report, supra note 164, § 3.33.
174. Panel Report, supra note 164, §§ 3.34-3.35.
175. Mexico had argued as follows:
To accept that one contracting party might impose trade restrictions to
conserve the resources of another contracting party would have the consequence of introducing the concept of extraterritoriality into the GATT, which
would be extremely dangerous for all contracting parties. In this context,
Mexico recalled that, under the MMPA, the United States not only arrogated
to itself this right of interference, but also the right of interference in trade
between other contracting parties, by providing for an embargo of countries
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Panel agreed, noting that unilateral national legislation such as the
MMPA threatened to undermine the multilateral trading framework
of the GATT, and was inconsistent with its principles."16 The Panel
reached essentially the same conclusion with regard to Article XX(g)."7
In argument before the GATT Panel in this case, Indonesia argued
that the MMPA exploited sympathy for marine mammals in order to
protect United States tuna producers, i.e. that it was a classic case of
using an environmental issue as a pretext for protectionism."18 It is to
some extent a sign of the times that, in the face of the new environmental challenge, developing countries have been more concerned
about preserving GATT rules than many industrialized powers have
been. This is attributable not so much to a new developing country
attitude towards trade liberalization, but to the fact that developing
countries fear that they stand to be the principal victims of both
"green protectionism" and "eco-imperialism."
On the other hand, the approach taken in the GATT Tuna Panel
Decision is considered by many environmentalists and other scholars
in the United States to be troubling." 9 They fear that it gives undue
priority to trade issues to the detriment of environmental issues. 80 The
narrow reading of the GATT's limited provisions regarding the environment which was adopted by the Panel suggested that the GATT
mechanism had proven to be fundamentally unsuited to the task of
greening the international trade order. As one analyst notes, "the
question arises: Should countries be pressured by GATT rules to
become part of the problem by providing a market for products made
in an environmentally harmful way?"''
considered to be "intermediary nations" simply because they continued to
buy products which the United States had unilaterally decided should not be
imported by itself or by any other country.
Panel Report, supra note 164, § 3.31.
176. Panel Report, supra note 164, §§ 5.27-5.29.
177. Panel Report, supra note 164, § 5.32.
178. The GATT Panel Report summarizes Indonesia's argument as follows:
Indonesia noted the importance of its trade in tuna products with the United
States, and further noted that this was the twenty-third time that the United
States had embargoed imports of tuna, starting with Spain in 1975. The
MMPA had been used as a means to continue this practice and shield United
States producers from import competition by exploiting public sympathy for
dolphins, which were in any event not a species listed as endangered under
CITES.
Panel Report, supra note 164, § 4.15. See also William Keeling, Indonesia Protests at
US Tuna Ban, FIN. TIMEs, Apr. 9, 1992, at 32.

179. See Von Moltke, supra note 149, at 527.
180. Von Moltke, supra note 149, at 527.

181. Paul Cough, Trade-Environment Tensions; Options Exist For Reconciling
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The GATT Tuna Panel Decision has not been adopted by a
consensus of the GATT Council, and so it is not technically binding
upon the parties. 2 Mexico has entered into a dolphin conservation
program with the United States and nine other nations which provides,
among other things, for observers on all tuna fleet operations, and at
least for the moment has not asked the Council to adopt the report. 83
The European Union, after initially pushing for adoption of that
decision by the Council, has called for a 2 year moratorium on all
GATT Panel decisions concerning the environment.18 4 Meanwhile, 5the
18
MMPA's ban on non-conforming tuna imports remains in effect.
The GATT Panel was careful to state in its report that its task
was limited to the examination of this matter in the light of the
relevant GATT provisions, and therefore did not call for a finding on
the appropriateness of United States or Mexican conservation policies. 86 The analysis of environmental issues is technically quite complex, and the scientific understanding of these issues continues to
evolve rapidly. One reason for the GATT Panels unwillingness to
consider the environmental aspects of the Tuna dispute is that the
Panel had no scientific environmental expertise to draw upon. The
GATT mechanism will not be able to give proper consideration to
environmental concerns until this situation is remedied.'87 Even if the
GATT Panel did have access to the necessary environmental expertise,
it would face difficult problems in deciding how to prioritize between
the benefits of free trade and those of environmental preservation in
cases where they proved to be in conflict.'
Trade and Environment, EPA J., (U.S. Environmental Protection Agency) Apr. 1993,
May 1993, June 1993 (joint issue), at 28.
182. Since the GATT agreement says little about dispute settlement procedures,

the latter have evolved through practice. See Understanding Regarding Notification,

Consultation, Dispute Settlement and Surveillance, GATT Doc. L/4907, Supp. No.
26, BISD 210 (1980); WELIMm DAVEY & JOHN
NATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 337-46 (1986).

JACKSON, LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTER-

183. See Maria Cone, U.S. Lists Tropical Pacific Dolphin Species as Depleted,

L.A. TIMES, Nov. 2, 1993, pt. A, at 3.

184. EC Parliament Adopts Two-Year Moratorium on GATT Panel Environmental Decisions, BNA INT'L EN v'T DALY, Jan. 27, 1993.
185. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1361(a)(2)(A)-(B) (1992).
186. Panel Report, supra note 164, § 6.1.
187. See Porter, supra note 161, at 111-13 (suggesting that the GATT might refer
some environmental issues to the Law of the Sea Tribunal, establish a cooperative
dispute resolution mechanism with the United Nations Environment Programme, or
establish a standing group of environmental experts within the GATT).
188. Porter, supra note 161, at 113-16.
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The GATT's environmental ignorance is clearly unacceptable in
the long run, but for now, the GATT's single-minded fixation upon
trade considerations does serve to shield developing countries from the
dual threats of green protectionism and eco-imperialism. Ultimately,
some type of limited environmental preferences for developing countries might be worthy of consideration as a way to compensate them
for the costs of environmentally desirable policies.18 9
4. "Sustainable Competitiveness" and InternationalEnvironmental
Standards
Environmental controls may have an adverse effect upon competitiveness. The term "environmental dumping" is often used to describe
the ability of an unregulated polluting producer to sell goods more
cheaply due to savings .from a less environmentally stringent manufacturing process and thus drive environmentally regulated producers out
of business.' 90 Fear of this practice was used in the United States as
an argument against NAFTA. Many seem to believe that "United
States industry is suffering as a result of disparities between relatively
stringent United States regulatory standards and those of many ...
United States trading partners."' 9' This view assumes a conflict between the proper functioning of a liberal trade regime ("thesis") and
the need to avoid the irreversible or otherwise unacceptable intergenerational effects of environmental damage ("antithesis").
Whatever view one takes concerning the past effect of environmental regulations upon competitiveness, 92 for the future there is
definitely a need to develop and implement a new "synthesis" concept
of "sustainable competitiveness" which reconciles these two concerns.
But as Edith Brown Weiss notes, sustainable competitiveness requires
the development and application of international environmental stan-

189. Along somewhat different but similar lines, see Policy Common Ground on
Trade, Environment Hard to find at Ministerial Meeting, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAILY,

Feb. 23, 1994 (quoting Kenneth Dadzie, Secretary-General of UNCTAD, as suggesting
that a special certification scheme should be created for environmentally friendly
products produced by developing countries).
190. See Carl F. Schwenker, Protecting the Environment and U.S. Competitive-

ness in the Era of Free Trade: A Proposal, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1355, 1395 (1993).
191. See Richard B. Stewart, Environmental Regulation and International Competitiveness, 102 YALE L.J. 2039, 2085 (1993).

192. Edith B. Weiss, Environmentally Sustainable Competitiveness: A Comment,
102 YALE L.J. 2123, 2133 (1993) (noting that there is no empirical evidence to support
the view that U.S. industry has suffered from disparities in environmental regulation).
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dards (or rather minimum standards) which level the playing field
environmentally speaking. 193
The acceptability of the minimum standard approach from the
developing country viewpoint will depend upon the implementation of
these standards. The simple imposition of Western standards upon
developing countries will be viewed as thinly veiled eco-imperialism to
be resisted. Weiss points out that three forms have emerged for the
development of international minimum standards, i.e. "identical standards, mutual recognition of comparable standards, and compatibility
of standards based on the underlying objectives."' 194 Others have
spoken of "domestic treatment," mutual recognition" and "harmonization."' 95 In each case the international standard is only a minimal
baseline standard leaving states free to adopt stricter environmental
standards.
The need for environmental standards in international trade is
also raised by the transboundary shipment of toxic wastes; usually
from industrialized countries to developing countries. The Basel
Convention'96 provides for notification to the receiving state of any
intention to transfer such wastes to its territory, and also requires that
state's consent before shipment. 197 This agreement, however, has been

193. Id.at 2123.
194. Id.at 2134.
195. Special Report: The Regulation of Environmental Standards by International
Trade Agreements, BNA INT'L ENV'T DAfLY, Sept. 15, 1993. NAFTA provides that

"without reducing the level 'of safety or of protection .. . the Parties shall, to the

greatest extent practicable, make compatible their respective standards-related measures, so as to facilitate trade in a good or service between the Parties." CanadaMexico-United States: North American Free Trade Agreement, art. 906, para. 2,
reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 289, 387 (1993). According to the NAFTA side agreement on
the environment, the Council of a newly created Commission for Environmental
Cooperation, is charged with the task of "without reducing levels of environmental
protection, establishing a process for developing recommendations on greater compatibility of environmental technical regulations, standards and conformity assessment
procedures in a manner consistent with the NAFTA." North American Agreement on
Environmental Cooperation Between the Government of Canada, the Government of
the United Mexican States and the Government of the United States of America 1993
Draft, art. 10, para. 3(b), reprinted in North American Free Trade Agreement Draft
Side Accord On Environment, BNA DALLY REP. FOR EXECUTIVES, Sept. 13, 1993, at
M175.
196. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, opened for signature Mar. 22, 1989, U.N. Doc. EP/
IG.80/3 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 649 (1989).
197. Id.art. 6.
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criticized for putting a stamp of approval upon the practice of exporting wastes to developing countries. 9
IV.

DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN THE FUTURE INTERNATIONAL TRADE
ORDER

A. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND GENETIC RESOURCES: A NEW ISSUE
RAISES OLD QUESTIONS

There are other ways in which the special problems and interests
of developing countries link international trade law issues and international environmental law issues. The Biodiversity Treaty which was
opened for signature at UNCED is designed to preserve biological
diversity for the benefit of future generations.'9 This treaty's obligations concerning conservation and monitoring may prove to be quite
burdensome, especially for developing countries which have severely
limited economic resources. Since developing countries are the "custodians" of such a large part of the world's biodiversity, funding
conservation of that biodiversity is a vitally important issue. While the
treaty does express the principle that developing countries should
receive some compensation from developed countries for conserving
biological diversity, 200 the specific funding provisions of that treaty are
quite weak. All contracting parties, developing and developed, agree
to provide financial support for the those nations attempting to
implement the treaty. 20 ' While developed countries do agree to provide
new and additional resources to enable developing country parties to
fulfill their obligations under the treaty, there is no provision which
mandates any particular level for this funding. Early proposed drafts
of the treaty would have required developed countries to provide an"
"adequate" level o'f funding. 20 2 No such standard of sufficiency is
provided for in the final text of the treaty.

198. See Steven Greenhouse, U.N. Conference Supports Curbs on Exporting of
TIMES, Mar. 23, 1989, § A, at 1.
199. Convention on Biological Diversity, opened for signature June 5, 1992,
reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818 (1992), pmbl. and arts. 1, 2 [hereinafter Biodiversity
Treaty].
200. Id. art. 20(2).
201. Id. art. 20(1).
202. Paul Roberts, International Funding for the Conservation of Biological
Diversity: Convention on Biological Diversity, 10 B.U. INT'L L.J. 303, 311-21 (1992)
[hereinafter InternationalFunding].

Hazardous Waste, N.Y.
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The question of decision-making procedures under that treaty also
illustrates how many current issues facing developing countries in the
environmental and developmental fields echo those they have faced in
the trade and development field since Bretton Woods. When Article
21 of the treaty describes the "Financial Mechanism" to be established
under the Treaty, it provides that "the mechanism shall operate within
a democratic and transparent system of governance." 20 3 The implication here is that the procedure of the decision-making body is not to
be as heavily weighted in favor of the donor states as it is under the
World Bank and the IMF, and that the deliberations of that body
should be public, again in contradistinction to the secrecy which
surrounds the deliberations of the Bretton Woods institutions.
At the same time, however, another part of the Biodiversity Treaty
provides that the Global Environmental Programme (GEF) (a cooperative venture of the World Bank, the United Nations Environment
Programme (UNEP) and the United Nations Development Programme
(UNDP)), is to serve on an interim basis as the institutional structure
under the treaty, but only if it has been "fully restructured in accordance with the requirements of Article 21," i.e. made more democratic
and open, and only until the details of a new institutional structure
have been designated. 20 4 Many doubt that there will be agreement on
a new financial structure any time soon, and thus the GEF is likely to
provide the treaty's institutional structure for some time. 20 5 Try as they
might, the developing countries are finding it difficult to escape from
the pervasive influence of the Bretton Woods institutions.
In the past, countries whose biological resources have been used
to develop profitable commercial drugs have received little or no
compensation in return. One of the better known examples involved
the Madagascar rosy periwinkle which is the source of the cancer drug
203. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 199, art. 21.
204. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 199, art. 39.
Article 39. Financial Interim Arrangements
Provided that it has been fully restructured in accordance with the requirements of Article 21, the Global Environment Facility of the United Nations
Development Programme, the United Nations Environment Programme and
the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development shall be the
institutional structure referred to in Article 21 on an interim basis, for the
period between the entry into force of this Convention and the first meeting
of the Conference of the Parties or until the Conference of the Parties
decides which institutional structure will be designated in accordance with
Article 21.
Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 199, art. 39.
205. International Funding, supra note 202, at 322.
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vincristine. That drug has earned millions of dollars, but Madagascar
has received absolutely no compensation. 2 6 One developing country,
Costa Rica, has developed a special arrangement with a private drug
company in order to facilitate research on the potential value of

biological samples from its territory and to ensure that the source

country shares in the financial benefits of that research.20 7 The Biodiv-

ersity Treaty might have done .more to generalize such a system, but

its provisions on the distribution of the benefits of biotechnology are
general and consequently quite weak. 20 8 The treaty has been criticized
for failing to better harness the market potential of biodiversity in

order to help developing countries finance conservation efforts. 2°9

Providing for a more effective international regime governing the
distribution of the benefits of biodiversity would have been difficult
and risky. One of the principal reasons cited by then President Bush
for his decision not to sign the treaty was the provisions governing the

distribution of benefits. 210 President Clinton has since reversed the
United States stand on this treaty, but if the weakened language of
this treaty was considered unacceptable by President Bush, it is possible
that stronger language would have been too much for any American
President. Strong international regimes which operate primarily for
the benefit of developing countries are a tough sell in the richer,

206. See Christopher Joyce, Prospectorsfor Tropical Medicines, NEW SCIENTIST,
Oct. 19, 1991, at 36, 38; International Funding, supra note 202, at 329-30.
207. Deal Between Drug Firm, Costa Rica CalledExample of What Treaty Would
Do, 15 INT'L ENVTL. REP. 398 (June 17, 1992).
208. Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 199, art. 19. Article 19(2) provides that:
Each Contracting Party shall take all practicable measures to promote and
advance priority access on a fair and equitable basis by Contracting Parties,
especially developing countries, to the results and benefits arising from
biotechnologies based upon genetic resources provided by those Contracting
Parties. Such access shall be on mutually agreed terms.
Biodiversity Treaty, supra note 199, art. 19(2).
209. InternationalFunding, supra note 202, at 341-42.
210. Former President Bush noted:
Many governments and many individuals from the U.S. and other nations
have pressed us to sign a treaty on what's called biodiversity ....

But the

truth is, it contains provisions that have nothing to do with biodiversity ....
The treaty includes provisions that discourage technological innovations, treat
them as common property though they are developed at great cost by private
companies and American workers. We know what will happen. Remove
incentives, and we'll see fewer of the technological advances that help us
protect our planet.
George Bush, Remarks on Departurefor the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, PUB. PAPERS 920 (June 11, 1992).

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 14

industrialized countries of the world, especially the United States.
B. DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AND INTERNATIONAL TRADE
AGREEMENTS IN THE 1990s

The Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations was successfully concluded in December of 1993,21 but it will be some time
before the effects of the agreements upon the developing countries as

a group can be fully appreciated.
Important for developing countries is the fact that the Uruguay
Round includes an agreement to phase out the MFA over 10 years,2 12

and thereby integrate the textiles and clothing sectors into the broader

GATT/WTO regime. Although the 10 year delay is regrettable, this
will finally end one of the more egregious forms of trade discrimination
against developing countries. Many developing country agricultural
exporters will benefit from the agreement to integrate the agricultural
sector into the multilateral trade regime. 2 3

As part of the overall agreement to phase out the MFA, the

United States at the last minute proposed to link access to the United

States textile market to the removal by each particular textile exporter
of its own barriers to textile and clothing imports. 2 4 While the United

States could not force acceptance of this proposal, as a compromise
developing countries did agree to "achieve" improved access to their

own markets for textile imports as opposed to merely "promoting"
such access.215 This language was flexible enough to permit both sides
to declare victory on this point at the conclusion of the deal. 21 6

211. Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral
Trade Negotiations, Document MTN/FA, Part I, of Dec. 15, 1993 and MTN/FA/
Corr.1 of Dec. 15, 1993, reproduced in 33 I.L.M. 1 (1994).
212. Textile Agreement, supra note 88, arts. 2(8), 9.
213. The Uruguay Round: Agreement on Agriculture, Document MTN/FA, Part
II, Annex 1A-3, of December 15, 1993 and MTN/FA/Corr.I of December 15, 1993,
mentioned but not reproduced at 33 I.L.M. 10 (1994). See also Cliff Taylor, Most
Developing Countries Will Gain Under GA TT Deal Many Asian States are Major
Producers Who Appear Set to Dominate the Market for Labour Intensive Goods,
THE IRISH TIMES, Feb. 1, 1994, at 12 (noting the importance of the agriculture sector
to many developing countries, and concluding that most developing countries should
benefit from the Uruguay Round).
214. Jim Ostroff, Mills Blast New GATT Accord; But Importers, Stores Back
It; General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, DAILY NEWS RECORD, Dec. 16, 1993, at
2 (noting that "this proposal was primarily aimed at forcing India and Pakistan to
drop their virtual ban on U.S. textile and apparel imports.").
215. Textile Agreement, supra note 88, art. 7(1).
216. Behr, supra note 88, at A41 (reporting that Deputy U.S. Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa called the WTO a peacemaker in global trade, which would benefit
from an enhanced ability to make binding decisions in trade disputes).
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One might be tempted to say that in zero-sum terms, the devel-

oping countries made significant concessions to the North by agreeing
to extend GATT rules into new areas like services, 217 investment 218 and

intellectual property rights. 219 Some from the South have complained

that they have given up too much, 220 and it does seems likely that the
rich industrial nations will reap most of the direct benefits of this
22
round. 1

But while developing countries may not initially derive as much
direct benefit from the Uruguay Round as will the industrialized
countries, a simplistic zero-sum view of this situation is not appropri-

ate. The completion of this round constitutes a major step towards a
more integrated and efficient global economy, and when implemented,

it should yield dynamic benefits for many developing countries such

as the NICs. Other developing countries, however, such as those of

to reap much benefit
sub-Saharan Africa, may not be in a 22position
2

from the new dynamic in world trade.
The developing countries comprise a very diverse group of countries with a full range of views concerning trade and trade liberaliza-

tion, and some of them are among those states most committed to

trade liberalization today. 223 In one way or another, most developing

217. General Agreement on Trade in Services, supra note 4.
218. Agreement on Trade Related Investment Measures, supra note 5.
219. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, supra
note 6.
220. See Martin Khor, Third World: Enter a New Institutional Trinity, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, Feb. 25, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File; Walter
Schwarz, Seeds of Discontent, THE GUARDIAN, Mar. 11, 1994, at 16 (reporting a
farmers revolt in India against the prospect that enforcement of new Uruguay Round
intellectual property rules will require them to buy new hybrid seeds every year from
private multinational companies).
221. See IAN GOLDIN ET AL., TRADE LIBERALISATION: GLOBAL ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 205 (1983) (projecting that over 60% of the net gains from partial multilateral
trade liberalization such as negotiated in the Uruguay Round would go to the OECD
(industrialized) Countries). The study also projected that by the year 2002, such an
agreement would lead to an increase in real income of 1.9% worldwide 1.9% for the
OECD (industrialized) regions, 0.6% in Africa and only 0.1% in Latin America. Id.
at 130. Low income regions, however, would experience a 2.976 increase in real
income, and "other" developing regions would realize an impressive 4% increase. Id.
at 148. See also For Richer or Poorer,THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 18, 1991, at 66.
222. Id.
223. See Taylor, supra note 213, at 12 (quoting Peter Sutherland, the Director
General of the GATT as stating that "One of the ironies of the round has been that
the greatest commitment to the multilateral trading system has come from the
developing world rather than the industrialized states"); Stephanie Nebehay, Devel-
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countries aspire to mutually beneficial trade relations with the rest of
the world. The chances of successfully achieving such relations during
the next decade will depend upon three key factors: the development
and broadening of regional trade agreements; attitudes within the
industrialized states linking domestic welfare issues and international
trade issues; and the dynamics of the move beyond the GATT framework to a new and more effective World Trade Organization.
1. Regional Trade Agreements
In the past, fear of domination by industrialized states has caused
developing countries to favor economic cooperation between developing countries (ECDC) as a path to economic independence, development and prosperity.2 24 Unfortunately, ECDC arrangements have not
been particularly successful due, in part, to a lack of complementarity
between developing country economies, and also in part to the generally low level of economic growth which they have experienced recently. 225 The real success story in regional trade arrangements has
been the European Union, and this has once again stranded developing
countries on the outside looking in. Now more than ever, as they
become part of a more integrated international economic order, these
countries need for some of the wealth of rich countries to flow in their
direction, and since massive additional transfers of foreign aid are
unlikely, international trade and investment are indispensable.
The economic fate of developing countries in the international
economic order over the next decade will depend to a large extent
upon the general approach to trade chosen by the United States, the
European Union, Japan and the other key players in the international
economic order. The consolidation of these industrialized countries
into regional trade blocs could have a detrimental effect upon the
oping Countries Urge Fair Uruguay Round Deal,

THE REUTER EUROPEAN COMMUNITY

Apr. 27, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Wires File (quoting G77
and UNCTAD statements critical of the United States, Europe and Japan for delaying
a GATT deal much needed by developing countries).
224. See TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 118, at 67.
225. In Latin America alone there are currently four ECDC trading groups: the
Andean Pact (Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela), the Central American
Common Market ((ACM) which includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Honduras and
Nicaragua), the Caribbean Common Market ((CARICOM) which includes 12 countries
in that area) and the Latin American Integration Association ((LAIA), comprising
Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Uruguay and the Andean Pact members).
Although some of these arrangements provide for far more integration than do some
others, none of them has been very effective in increasing the share of intra-group
trade in"recent years. See TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT REPORT, supra note 118, at 67.
REPORT,
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interests of those developing countries which are not central to such
blocs. Such blocs do not generally link developing countries to a major
industrialized economy, 226 but the recently concluded North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)22 7 represents both an exception, and
perhaps a harbinger of things to come. Mexico, by joining its economic
fate to that of the United States and Canada, will be in a position to
share in a process of economic growth with two of the world's most
powerful economies. Other parts of Latin America may eventually be

consolidated into the NAFTA sphere as well.
If the trend towards regional integration continues, the Asian
228
NICs may eventually join with Japan in an Asian trading bloc.

If

access to foreign markets through bilateral or regional arrangements.

229

this does come to pass, the least developed "Fourth World" states of
Africa and Asia will find themselves more isolated than ever. Regional
economic integration into free trade areas is unlikely to improve their
lot over the next decade. For these countries, the success of global
trade talks was essential because they lacked the power to negotiate

226. The European Union (formerly the European Community) has maintained
a special relationship with a group of former colonies know as the ACP States
(African, Caribbean, and Pacific) but they have never been part of the EU/EC. In
any case, the benefits of the limited trade preferences granted to the ACP states have
never lived up to the expectations of the latter. See P. Kenneth Kiplagat, Fortress

Europe and Africa Under the Lom6 Convention: From Policies of Paralysis to a
Dynamic Response, 18 N.C. J. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 589, 624-25 (1993).

227. NAFTA, supra note 195.
228. See Anthony Rowley, Does the Shadow of Nafta Spell Gloom for Gatt?,
Bus. TIMES, Feb. 9, 1994, at 1I (noting that before the Uruguay Round was concluded
Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, reportedly acting with the encouragement of Japan, had suggested that an East Asian Economic Grouping, later referred
to as an East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC), could help protect Asian trade interests
if the multilateral round were to fail, and suggesting that even with the successful
completion of the Uruguay round the EAEC might still be needed).
229. Kiplagat, supra note 226, at 630-31. Examining the states of Africa, the
Caribbean, and Pacific States, Kiplagat concludes that:
ACP countries must recognize that the only forum which presents an
opportunity for a forward movement is the GATT forum. ACP and other
developing nations should not hope for miracles from the Uruguay Round.
In fact, chances are that any agreement that may be worked out in the talks
will fall far short of what many developing countries are now seeking.
However, there will be significant forward-looking measures that will be
[Dieveloping countries must yield on the issue of services
incorporated ....
in order to establish some quid pro quo necessary to fashion out an
agreement. In doing so, developing countries could acquire leverage with
which they could ask for the removal of trade restraints by developing
countries.
Kiplagat, supra note 226, at 630-31.
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2. Links Between Domestic Welfare Issues and InternationalTrade
Issues.
In all of the industrial democracies, there are economic and
psychological links between international trade policy and domestic
social policy. Nowhere is this linkage more apparent, or more important, than in the United States. The recent debate concerning the
ratification of NAFTA is illustrative.
Some opponents of NAFTA in the United States have passionately
argued that this agreement, when implemented, will impose an unacceptable cost upon the most vulnerable segments of United States
society. 2 0 They point out that unskilled workers, the poor, minorities,
and the unemployed will be expected to bear the brunt of the dislocations caused in the United States by NAFTA, and stress that these
are the very same people who suffered the most from the domestic
economic policies of the 1980s and early 1990s. 231
Conceding readily that these elements of United States society
have suffered enough, especially in recent years, does not constitute
sufficient reason to oppose NAFTA. Low wage workers, unskilled
workers, and the unemployed have suffered in this country for a
number of reasons. In part, they have suffered because many of the
low wage jobs they have held are indeed disappearing in the transitional
restructuring towards a globally integrated economy. Protectionism
cannot save these jobs in the long run, but it can delay the process of
structural adjustment which is the best hope of creating new jobs and
opportunities for this country in the future. Workers have also suffered
because national economic policies in the United States have not
created a true national community which provides for the fundamental
needs of all. The unfortunate hardship affecting the least affluent
segments of United States society cannot be attributed retroactively to
NAFTA, and rejecting NAFTA would not have provided an effective
remedy for their situation.
The decision to link the United States economy with that of
Mexico and Canada under NAFTA was an important step towards
acceptance of broader hemispheric and even global economic communities. The United States Congress might have decided to reject
NAFTA out of economic nationalism but choosing such a course
would have repeated the same mistake in international economic and
230. See Thomas B. Edsall, Issue Has Aroused the Left; Progressives Vent their
Discontent, THE WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 1993, § 1, at Al.
231. Id.
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social policy which has been made in the domestic social policy of this
country.
Some labor leaders and many environmentalists in the United
States opposed NAFTA because of low wages and other unfavorable
2 2 The human rights of
working conditions which prevail in Mexico.
those in Mexico, whether civil, political, economic, or environmental,
can best be promoted not by restricting United States trade with
Mexico, but by building upon the economic and social ties which bind
the two countries. Because of our 2,000 mile long common border,
we are already bound together to a very large extent. It makes little
sense to attempt to deny that link by retreating ostrich-like into an
isolationist mentality.
As we move towards a globally integrated economy the time has
come to develop a broader sense of community and shared destiny,
both within the United States and in the broader global community.
Better and more effective laws and institutions will be essential to
building these communities. Unfortunately, both the sense of community and the legal and institutional underpinnings of that community
have been slow to develop even within the United States, as the gap
between rich and poor has been permitted to widen over the past 13

years .233

In spite of the enormous wealth and overall prosperity of the
United States, our country failed to protect the economic and social
rights of its workers during the 1980s. Even our children have been
allowed to suffer more than those in the rest of the industrialized
world,23 4 and we could learn much from other nations about building
a community of citizens, both nationally and internationally. It is
ironic that even under these conditions, it is the United States which
must provide leadership in global trade negotiations. President Clinton,
perhaps aware of this irony, was careful to promise United States
workers that despite their fears and suspicions concerning NAFTA, he
would ensure that they would share in the economic benefits of that

agreement .23

232. See Labor issues Associated with NAFTA, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Sept.
21, 1993, available in LEXIS, News Library, Nafta File.
233. Charles Stein, As FinancialPolarizationGrows, Politics Takes on a Harsher
Edge-The Down-Sized American Dream, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 20, 1992, at 1.
234. See Young and Poor, Cm. TRmB., Oct. 3, 1993, § 4, at 3 (summarizing parts
of a UNICEF report stating that "among children in leading industrial countries...
only those in the United States and Britain are poorer today than they were in 1970;

in the United States, one child in five lives below the poverty level.").

235. At the signing ceremony for NAFTA, President Clinton acknowledged the
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3. Beyond GA TT to a New World Trade Organization
In recent years, environmental issues have challenged the principles
and institutions of the international trade order.236 Now that the
principle has been accepted that rational economic analysis requires
that environmental effects be taken into account, a new issue has been
raised. Can the GATT mechanism be properly adapted to respond to
environmental concerns? If not, how can the newly recognized environmental imperative be incorporated into the international trade
regime?
Doubts about the adequacy of the GATT are not limited to those
raised by environmental issues. Much has changed since the GATT
was founded. Decolonization has created many new independent states
with special trade problems. The Cold War has come and gone, and
has left in its wake a number of new "economies in transition" in
Eastern Europe. The environmental imperative must increasingly be
accommodated as the effects of environmental damage become more
apparent.
linkage between domestic welfare issues and international trade issues, as he promised
to pursue legislation to promote retraining of displaced workers. NAFTA Signing
Ceremony, supra note 107.
And we must see to it that our citizens have the personal security to
confidently participate in this new era. Every worker must receive the
education and training he or she needs to reap the rewards of international
competition, rather than to bear its burdens ...

we must seek to reconstruct

the broad-based political coalition for expanded trade. For decades, working
men and women, and their representatives supported policies that brought
us prosperity and security. That was because we recognized that expanded
trade benefitted all of us, but that we have an obligation to protect those
workers who do bear the brunt of competition by giving them a chance to
be retrained and to go on to a new and different and ultimately more secure
and more rewarding way of work.
In recent years, this social contract has been sundered. It cannot continue.
When I affix my signature to the NAFTA legislation a few moments from
now, I do so with this pledge-to the men and women of our country who
were afraid of these changes, and found in their opposition to NAFTA an
expression of that fear, what I thought was a wrong expression, and what I
know was a wrong expression, but nonetheless, represented legitimate fearsthe gains from this agreement will be your gains, too. I ask those who oppose
NAFTA to work with us to guarantee that the labor and side agreements are
enforced, and I call on all of us who believed in NAFTA to join with me to
urge the Congress to create the world's best worker training and retraining
system.

NAFTA Signing Ceremony, supra note 107.

236. See supra notes 123-98 and accompanying text.
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But as the Tuna Panel Decision shows, the GATT has proven to

be quite resistant to the "greening effect" of heightened environmental

consciousness which has already had a significant, although limited,
effect upon the operations of the World Bank. Developments in
environmental science are gradual and continual, and thus any trade
regime which truly incorporates environmental factors will have to

exhibit some considerable flexibility. This is exactly what the GATT
lacks .237

A key part of the agreement reached in the Uruguay Round of
GATT negotiations provides for the creation of a new World Trade

Organization (WTO) 38 to implement and administer the rules and

regulations governing international trade agreed to in that round and
9
in future global trade negotiations. 23 The plan for the new WTO was
24
formally endorsed at a recent ministerial meeting in Marrakesh. 0 The
United States government took a very high profile in supporting the
creation of a permanent Committee on Trade and the Environment at

that meeting, 24' but no242consensus has yet emerged about how that

committee will operate.
Hopefully, the new WTO will be better suited to the task of
integrating environmental factors into the international trade regime
than was the GATT. 243 The WTO will supersede the GATT, and in
237. Von Moltke, supra note 149, at 525.
238. Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Document MTN/
FA, Part 1I, pages 1-14, of Dec. 15, 1993, and MTN/FA/Corr.1 of Dec. 15, 1993,
reproduced at 33 I.L.M. 13 (1994).
239. Id. art. Ii.
240. See Williams, supra note 151, at 7.
241. See United States Trade Representative Mickey Kantor Remarks on Trade
and the Environment at the Global Legislators Organizationfor a Balanced Environment, FEDERAL NEWS SERVICE, Feb. 28, 1994, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Wires File. U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor stated that a standing committee
on trade and the environment must be created at the Marrakesh meeting, and that it
should be charged with providing ongoing environmental input to the WTO. In the
course of these comments he criticized the closed way in which the GATT had tried
to deal with environmental issues in the past, and noted that non-governmental
organizations were not even allowed to file amicus briefs. He stressed that the United
States wanted open, transparent proceedings providing public access to NGOs, environmental groups, and to business. Id.
242. See Williams, supra note 151, at 7 (noting that a wide gulf exists between
environmentalists who want to change GATT rules to facilitate the use of trade
restrictions for environmental protection, and the developing countries which fear such
a change would provide a pretext for protectionism aimed primarily at developing
countries).
243. See Europe and America Figleaf Munt, THE ECONOMIST, Nov. 13, 1993, at
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doing so, strengthen the enforcement of the principles of the international trade order. Developing countries have a lot to gain from this
development, particularly if the new organization proves to be capable
of shielding them from environmentally based trade barriers or "greenprotectionism."
One anticipated advantage of the new WTO is that it will bring
greater "automaticity" to the resolution of international trade disputes
than did the GATT. Under the GATT system a GATT party could
take its complaint to an independent panel for a judgment, but that
judgment did not become legally binding unless approved by the GATT
Council. Under the WTO, panel decisions will automatically be adopted
by the WTO Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) after 60 days unless the
DSB decides by consensus not to adopt them.2 44
The Clinton Administration has praised the strengthened dispute
settlement mechanism agreed to in the Uruguay Round, noting that it
will "enable better enforcement of United States rights," 2 4 while at
the same time stressing that since the prior GATT practice of decisionmaking by consensus has been retained. "This will continue to enable
the United States to prevent the application to it of a decision that it
perceives to be contrary to its interest.' ' 246 This may sound like a veto,
and indeed the United States administration seems to be presenting it
as such to the United States public and Congress. Nonetheless, the
language of the WTO Agreement leaves open the possibility that a
decision can be taken by majority vote if a consensus cannot be
achieved. 24 7 A prominent member of Congress has stated that while he
62 (noting that Sir Leon Brittan, Trade Commissioner of the European Union, had
suggested that a WTO might be more effective than the GATT in dealing with a
global economy whose financial and ecological aspects could not have been anticipated
by the original GATT signatories in 1947).
244. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-Multilateral Trade Negotiations
(The Uruguay Round): Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Document MTN/FA, Part II, Annex II, of Dec. 15, 1993 and
MTN/FA/Corr.1 of Dec. 15, 1993, reproducedas 33 I.L.M. 112 (1994).
245. SUMMARY OF TRADE AGREEMENTS RESULTING FROM THE URUGUAY ROUND OF

MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATION U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE DISPATCH,

Vol. 4,

Supp. No. 5, Dec. 1993, at 12.
246. Id. at 13.
247. See Agreement Establishing World Trade Organization, supra note 238, art.
IX(1):
The [WTO] shall continue the practice of decision-making by consensus
followed under the GATT 1947. Except as otherwise provided, where a
decision cannot be arrived at by consensus, the matter at issue shall be
decided by voting. At meetings of the Ministerial Conference and the General
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supports the substantive trade liberalization agreements of the Uruguay
Round, he is opposed to the WTO because it would transform the
consensual GATT mechanism where the U.S. has "real power" into
system, with 117
a "Third-World dominated, dictatorship-dominated
248
decision.
the
countries making
It remains to be seen whether the WTO will in practice be any
more sensitive than was the GATT to the special needs of the developing countries in issues of trade, development and the environment.
After their experience in trying to moderate the often rigid principles
of the GATT and the Bretton Woods institutions, developing countries
could use some assurance that in its operations, the new WTO will

reflect their interests and their perspectives, and not just those of the
24 9
industrialized economic powers. The latter states were the architects
of the Bretton Woods system, and they have also been its principal
beneficiaries. 250 Developing countries will want a more active role in
both the new WTO and in global management in general, but they

Council, each Member of the WTO shall have one vote. Where the European
Communities exercise their right to vote, they shall have a number of votes
equal to the number of their Member States which are Members of the
[WTO]. Decisions of the Ministerial Conference and the General Council
shall be taken by a majority of the votes cast, unless otherwise provided in
this Agreement or the Multilateral Trade Agreements.
248. Ronald Taylor, Job Hope Called Dim for Unskilled, THE WASH. TIMES,
Apr. 25, 1994, at A4.
249. Luis Fernando Jaramillo, a Colombian diplomat who has chaired the
negotiating group of developing countries (the G77), has stated that "The terms of
[the WTO'sl creation suggest that this organization will be dominated by the industrialized countries and that its fate will be to align itself with the World Bank and the
IMF." Khor, supra note 220.
250. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., International Monetary Collaboration, (book
review), 80 AM. J. INT'L LAW 237, 240 (1986) in which he comments upon the
structural bias of the Bretton Woods system.
Western industrial countries, of course, devised the Bretton Woods system,
and those same countries have in absolute terms been the main beneficiaries
of that system. This has been dramatically illustrated in the international
debt crisis. Western bankers clamored to make loans of unprecedented size
to Latin American countries in the 1970s. In retrospect, those loans were
irresponsibly large, especially in light of the higher interest rates that have
prevailed in the 1980s (itself a result of undisciplined or irresponsible U.S.
policy). Even though most of the misjudgment was that of Western officials
and bankers, the burden of the debt crisis has fallen mostly on the Latin
American countries themselves, which have forgone needed capital goods
imports and local capital formation to pay just the yearly interest charges,
and whose people have suffered declines in real wages for most of the 1980s.
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must take a realistic approach. Recalling the failure of the earlier call
for a largely unrealistic New International Economic Order should
help developing countries to moderate their expectations.
Despite the progress made at the Uruguay Round there is still a
need for institutional reform in international economic decision-making. Now that the difficult negotiations of that round have been
successfully concluded, GATT Secretary General Peter Sutherland has
suggested that a new high-level framework is needed to coordinate
international economic policy."' This new forum would bring together
developing countries, transitional economies and the industrialized
world; and would supersede western-dominated fora such as the Group
of Seven meetings of major industrial powers (G-7) and the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in trying
to coordinate the activities of the IMF, the World Bank and the new
252
WTO.
CONCLUSIONS

Although the negotiations at Bretton Woods and Havana were
based on an incomplete vision of the future world and its problems,
one that did not adequately take into account the situation of developing countries; the dynamic and open aspects of that vision are still
valid, and should be applied, mutatis mutandis, to the world today.
Then, as now, restrictive nationalistic approaches to international
economic relations offer no real hope for the future. Nonetheless,
many who are concerned about the costs of structural adjustment cling
to economic nationalism and protectionism out of despair.
The problem of integrating environmental concerns into the trade
order adds a new level of complexity, and raises potential problems
of "green protectionism" and of "eco-imperialism" as developed
market countries attempt to apply their environmental standards to
products from the developing countries. A fair and "sustainable
.competitiveness" will require the development of appropriate interna251. Cliff Taylor, Sutherland Proposes New Forum to Give the World's Poor a
Bigger Say, THE IRISH TIMES, Jan. 29, 1994, at 12.
252. GATT Director Peter Sutherland noted:
We cannot continue with a majority of the world's people excluded from
participation in global economic management ....
For instance, the G-7
self-evidently excludes most of the world's population and a large number
of the world's substantial and fast-growing economies ....
The fact is that
the countries which will increasingly provide our best hope for economic
growth and new markets are simply not represented where it counts.
George, supra note 1, at 15.
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tional environmental standards which do not call for a disproportionate
sacrifice by the ones who can least afford it. This objective can only
be achieved if environmental preservation in the developing world is
linked to increased financial and technical assistance from developed
countries and market access to those countries. The old GATT framework has proven to be inadequate for this broad new task, but given
their unpleasant experience with decision-making structures in the IMF
and the World Bank, the developing countries must be concerned
about the strength of their role in the future WTO.
The institutions of the international economic order must be
adapted to deal with today's changed circumstances. Stephen A. Silard
has noted, for example, that changes in international finance have not
been matched by a corresponding development of international rules.'"
Thus there has been a massive buildup of developing country debt,
but "no orderly way seems to exist by which either the sovereign can
definitively outgrow its excessive debt or the creditors can cut their
losses.' '214 It will be impossible for developing countries to repay the
debt they owe to the industrialized countries unless the former can
obtain access to foreign exchange by exporting goods to the latter.
Thus, the failure of the international trade regime to provide developing countries with access to Northern markets exacerbates an international debt problem which threatens prosperity in North and South
alike. The lack of progress in resolving international economic problems has a detrimental effect upon international peace and security as
well.
In recent years, the world has made remarkable progress in the
political sphere. The end of the Cold War has permitted the United
Nations to take a record number of peacekeeping and other initiatives
to promote international peace and security, democracy and human
rights. 255 The unparalleled proliferation of these UN political operations provides evidence of an increasing consciousness of global security interdependence. But at the same time, industrialized countries
have been more reluctant than developing countries to accept the full

253. Stephen A. Silard, International Law and the Conditions for Order in
InternationalFinance:Lessons of the Debt Crisis, 23 INT'L LAW. 963, 965 (1989). He
laments the failure of the international law of finance to adapt to changed circumstances, but given the clear link between trade and finance, his point is equally relevant
as applied to the international trade regime and its weak and outdated norms. Id.
254. Id.
255. See Bartram S. Brown, The Protection of Human Rights in Disintegrating
States: A New Challenge, 68 CHi. KENT L. REv. 203, 215-24 (1992).
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extent of global economic interdependence.21 6 In the long run, a higher
level of global security cannot be assured until the increase in international political cooperation has been accompanied by more effective
international economic cooperation. The need to preserve the global
environmental commons brings the need for such cooperation into
sharp focus. Economic logic requires the integration of the international regimes governing trade, development and the environment; but
to be effective this must be done on terms which wealthy states, poor
states, newly industrialized states, and states whose economies are in
transition can all hope to live with.
States have been able to take certain economic insights gained
from experience in national policy and apply them to international
problems. Practical lessons have been learned on both the national
and the international level, i.e., regarding the benefits of privatization
and freer markets. Ultimately, however, it will be necessary to internalize and codify into legal structures the equally important lesson
that it is dangerous and ultimately unacceptable for a society to ignore
the economic well being of its poorer members. This is true both of
the national society within a state and of the relatively fragmented
international society of states.

256. As Chan Heng Chee, Permanent Representative of Singapore to the United
Nations once noted:
There are probably numerous reasons why more progress has been achieved
in international political relations than in international economic relations.
A possible reason could be that in the global political sphere, many countries
understand that they share a commonality of interests in mutual survival,
whilst international economic relations is viewed as a zero sum game.
Markets, technology, exports, foreign exchange are seen as proprietary and
exclusive. Economic competition is viewed as natural, whilst political cooperation is perceived as a necessity.
Russell L. Barsh, Current Developments: A Special Session of the UN General
Assembly Rethinks the Economic Rights and Duties of States, 85 AM. J. INT'L. L.
192, 193 (1991).

